



eu2002.dk



Humanities– Essential Research for Europe

**Humanities–
Essential Research for Europe**

Danish Research Council for the Humanities

Photos: Geert Mørch

Layout: Glud & Jensen

Circulation: 2000 copies

Printing: Reproset

ISBN: 97-90201-58-2

Humanities- Essential Research for Europe

Danish Research Council for the Humanities, 2003



The European Commission and the Council of Ministers have launched the concept of the European Research Area (ERA) as a powerful vision for European research in the 21st century. It calls for the overcoming of national boundaries and obstacles in order to facilitate coherence, mobility and joint efforts across Europe. Ultimately, it aims at strengthening the capacity of European researchers to contribute to economic competitiveness and quality of life. In this context, there is a need for the Humanities to identify its role in the European Research Area.

The conference *Humanities—Essential Research for Europe*—held during the Danish Presidency of the European Union—aimed to highlight the role of the Humanities in Europe to enhance our understanding of important European social and cultural problems. The conference demonstrated the added value of European collaboration to the research of the Humanities. The conference ended up in several suggestions on how to strengthen the outreach role of the Humanities to European economic, social, cultural and political life.



Contents

- 9 **Introduction** by Professor *Poul Holm*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities
- 15 **Official Opening** by member of the Danish Folketing, *Hanne Severinsen*, President of the Research Committee of the Folketing
- Keynote speakers:
- 19 **Language and Prehistory** by Professor *Bernard Comrie*, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig
- 33 **History and Identity** by Dr. *Nora Behrend*, St Catharine's College, Cambridge
- 51 **Lifelong Learning as Potential of European Development**
by Professor *Peter Alheit*, Department of Education, Georg-August-University, Göttingen
- 71 **Culture, Media and Globalisation** by Professor *Ib Bondebjerg*, Department of Film and Media Studies, University of Copenhagen
- Briefing Session:
- 89 **The Humanities in the European Research Area**
by Dr Peter Fisch, DG Research, European Commission
- 95 **Forward Looks in European Research in the Humanities**
by Professor Gretty M. Mirdal
- 101 Declaration of the Odense Conference, October 2002:
The contribution of the Humanities to the Objectives of the European Research Area
- 107 **List of participants**
- 113 **Programme for the conference**
- 118 Mandate for **European Network of Research Councils for the Humanities**



Introduction

By PROFESSOR POUL HOLM
DANISH RESEARCH COUNCIL FOR THE HUMANITIES

A very warm welcome to you all at this conference on the contribution of the humanities to the general objectives of the European Union.

Presiding over the official programme of the conference you see a painting of Hans Christian Andersen, the world-famous Danish author. His tale of the ugly duckling, which turned into a beautiful swan, might conveniently be thought of today as an allegory of how we want to view the future of the humanities in Europe. However, Andersen's tales should not be interpreted in this facile way. The little duckling only turned into a swan when it changed its own perception of itself; that is, when it identified its peers on the lake and made an effort to change its habitat.

In like fashion, this conference is dedicated to the twofold objective of understanding the innate qualities of the humanities, which may be undervalued or go unnoticed by the general public and politicians as essential input to the future of Europe, and, conversely, of dedicating ourselves to the necessary changes we must initiate in our own midst and in the habitat of the humanities if we wish to play a peer role in formulating the European Research Area and in building European research infrastructure. Far from merely propagating the necessity of the humanities in Europe, we urge this conference to mark a real step forward by iden-

tifying necessary insights and messages to Europe – that is today’s chief task – and to consider how we can maximize our influence on both the funding mechanisms and public outreach – that is the chief task of tomorrow’s workshops.

To achieve our first goal we have invited four keynote speakers, Dr Nora Berend, Professors Peter Alheit, Bernard Comrie and Ib Bondebjerg, to share with us their trail-blazing research in four fields of the humanities that demonstrate the need for humanistic research for the future of Europe. The panel discussion will focus on how their research might be taken to a new level if the vision of the European Research Area comes true.

In tomorrow’s workshops we will discuss how we can increase the quality of research in the humanities by stimulating comparative research, by building research infrastructure and by identifying the role of the humanities in future integrated projects of the European Framework programme. Ultimately, this conference is aimed at opening up debate on how we can structure – or perhaps restructure – the humanities to maximize our role in the European Research Area.

The humanities have a special obligation as regards research in national cultural heritage and culture generation. But even then the quality of research must be promoted by means of international cooperation.

There is no common definition of the humanities in Europe, and the distinction between the human and the social sciences is often blurred. This is no real problem as long as good cooperation between the research councils and between disciplines is maintained. More fundamentally, the humanities are often not even defined as belonging to the world of science, as administrators and colleagues from other sciences apply the Anglo-Saxon distinction between science and the humanities. The notion of the two cultures of the natural sciences and the arts is a real impediment to acceptance of the humanities in many major research-funding programmes and in the development of true interdisciplinarity. When the Danish Ministry for Science, Technology and Innovation

was instituted only last year, many of us worried that an Anglo-Saxon definition of the Ministry's name would leave the humanities out on a limb like an ugly duckling. Today I am pleased to note that our worries seem to have been unfounded. The present and coming fiscal years defy any worries that we had and confirm what I believe to be a general European trend: that the humanities are increasingly being recognized – albeit slowly and with occasional reluctance – as a full player on the science scene.

This morning the heads of the research councils took an important step in assuming that full role by establishing the European Network of Research Councils for the Humanities. The ERCH is designed to raise the voice of the humanities in Europe. What we are going to say will in large measure be decided by the present conference.

This year the Danish Research Council for the Humanities presented an ambitious strategy for the next five years. The plan has been sent to all delegates, and we welcome your comments. The ERCH has been set up precisely to share information and stimulate debate between national research councils in Europe

- on best practices, resources and quality control,
- and to further collaboration with respect to national programmes sharing common themes.

The ERCH was also set up to influence the funding bodies for research at European level. Now that the new framework programme of the European Union is close to being implemented, there is a need for a debate about research cooperation within the humanities in general and the humanities' participation in the EU framework programme in particular. But even as it is, researchers in the humanities do not benefit sufficiently from the existing research funding possibilities offered by the EU system. One of the items on future agendas needs to be how to make researchers respond to the EU Commission's announcements and to streamline the humanities to be partners of the big Integrated Projects.

We may define the humanities as being about humankind's

identity, basic values, communications, society and history. The humanities include aesthetic, linguistic, philosophical-educational and historical disciplines. Research in the humanities must generate knowledge, know-how and insight as a foundation for society, for the cultural, ethical and political choices to be made, and in order to develop our creative capabilities. Research in the humanities must be conducted for the benefit and enjoyment of citizens and hence be made accessible, relevant and when possible applicable to the society, culture and economy of the future.

The challenges facing research in the humanities come, in particular, from the forces of globalization, from the readjustment from an industrial to a knowledge-based society, and from the rapid changes in the population composition and culture base of Europe.

In a knowledge-based society the humanities are central to output, to the life of the community and to the political debate. Economic growth is dependent on human resources, learning skills, the ability to communicate, cultural understanding and creative development, which are directly linked to pure research in the arts and humanities and to the universities' production of graduates. The humanities are part of the actual foundation of the knowledge economy. There is therefore a need both to safeguard pure research into the humanities and to develop the dialogue between researchers and society. New fields of research should be cultivated in order to supply a humanistic dimension to problem areas central to society. Our research must exploit the potential offered by information technology.

In politics and economics alike, socially sustainable solutions are the order of the day, i.e. solutions that are not merely tenable in technical and economic terms, but also ethically and socially. Information technology, biotechnology and social development challenge our very concept of the human being and our standards of the good life and democratic principles on which European civilization is built. Topics central to the humanities, such as education, breeding, culture and gender, are being debated in society.

This debate asks questions of research into the humanities, in the hope of shedding light on human identity, basic values, communications, society and history.

Research in the humanities is instrumental in not only understanding but also transforming society. One of the ways in which this is achieved is in the pioneering of new forms of interdisciplinary cooperation that have evolved within recent years. Humanities researchers are collaborating with IT, medical, natural science and social science researchers in ways that were once inconceivable. In particular, collaboration has been developed in fields of research such as the environment, food, health and welfare. New scope has been generated for innovation through so-called art-science technology, including multimedia technology, the threshold of which we are still just teetering on, but which offers great potential for the industry of the future.

The humanities are in the midst of a restructuring process where, taking on board traditional core areas, there must be space to assimilate new ideas and researchers. The universities, however, are taking on very few new researchers. The demand for humanities research has not been matched by a corresponding addition of new posts. The increasing average age among employed researchers further means that there is a great need to develop and enhance the quality of researcher training in order to safeguard the generational hand-over. Key to this process will be the lead taken by research directors in building teams of experienced and junior researchers, multidisciplinary teams driven by curiosity-oriented and issues-oriented questions rather than by traditional subjects. There is therefore a need to develop a plan for European research, which

- injects funding into new fields of research central to the development of the knowledge society
- safeguards the changeover from generation to generation
- ensures dissemination of the research to society
- promotes interaction between the research and its end-users.

We need to set high objectives for the humanities for the future.
Thank you for participating and for contributing over the next
two days.

Official Opening

By HANNE SEVERINSEN

PRESIDENT OF THE RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF THE DANISH FOLKETING

Welcome to this conference, which takes place in Odense, the city where Hans Christian Andersen spent his childhood and went around dreaming of a better future.

Humanities – Essential Research for Europe is the title.

This conference has been organized in collaboration between the European Commission and the Danish Research Council for the Humanities.

The European Commission has launched the concept of the European Research Area, and in this context it is a good initiative on the occasion of the Danish chairmanship to call together personalities in humanistic research from all over Europe to come and talk about common research projects in the field of the humanities that ought to be essential.

Lots of other conferences will take place on other scientific topics during these months in Denmark. Next week, for instance, I shall be taking part in a conference entitled "Do we need a European Research Council?"—the same week the Danish government will be conducting negotiations on the future research council and funding system in Denmark.

Besides the presidency of the European Union, we have also held the chairmanship of COST and EUREKA. And that will result in other meetings and conferences.

We—or I, at least—must admit that when we think about European research programmes, we normally think of natural science and technology, in matters of biotechnology and nanoscience.

When we talk about the necessity to be competitive with the United States and the new Asian economies in the knowledge society, we tend to talk about industrial growth and the development of new technologies.

But first of all, new technology affects changes in civic society and cultural patterns. There are many humanistic aspects to all these new developments in technology. We have to know how it affects us in all areas of our life. Humanities are needed in order to foresee what is going to happen in future. All changes need a humanistic perspective.


And second but not least: the nature of production has changed. More and more intangible—or you might call them intelligent—products are being brought to market, and even technological devices have to have a humanistic dimension in order to create something really new.

The private sector needs humanistic knowledge, and only if technology and humanistic science go hand in hand will it be able to create new ideas for the manufacturing sector of tomorrow. So perhaps this could be the real strength of the European contribution to the world economy.

In Denmark, humanistic studies are a success story. Studying history, literature, anthropology and media, for instance, is a very attractive prospect for young students. But on the other hand these students have had difficulties using their skills and competences to find employment. Or you might say that it is difficult for the labour market to absorb them owing to the lack of knowledge on both sides.

The humanities should be aware of the challenge to the private sector, and the private sector should be aware of the many humanistic competences they not only need but may not realize they need! And what of unemployment, we may well ask?

This is the reason why, for years now, Danish discussions have



dealt with the dilemma that young people are supposed to be more interested in science and technology—an area young people are unwilling to embark on—not just in Denmark but also in western society as such.

I think we should deal with this problem in such a way that we have more humanities in technology and vice versa, in order to attract both.

This conference deals with common European ground in the humanities. We know that the EU Commission wants to raise awareness of our common European values, and I cannot but support this. And yet it is much more important, I think, that you, the humanistic scientists, take a look around society for yourselves and pose questions about national and European values. Our richness has long paved the way for national and European cultures, languages and history, for worse and now for better. It should be a bottom-up process. The role of the European institutions should be to facilitate the building of infrastructure—but the ideas should come from you. The Sixth Framework Programme has successfully integrated the option of allowing the humanities to take part in bigger projects, and I sincerely hope that the science of the humanities in Europe will provide opportunities for doing so.

In the workshops over the next few days, you will be making recommendations as to how the European Science Area should also be an area for the humanities. That is essential—and I hope you will contribute ideas that help the humanities to continue determining the European agenda.

Language and Prehistory: How Linguists Can Cooperate with Other Sciences in Uncovering Prehistoric Human Population Movements

By BERNARD COMRIE

Bernard Comrie is Director of the Department of Linguistics at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig. His main interests are language universals and typology, historical linguistics (including in particular the use of linguistic evidence in interdisciplinary research to reconstruct aspects of prehistory), linguistic fieldwork and languages of the Caucasus.

Within linguistics, there is a tradition of using linguistic evidence in order to reconstruct aspects of prehistory, in particular prehistoric population movements. In this paper I wish to emphasize the importance of combining evidence from linguistics with that from other disciplines, in particular archaeology and genetics, in order to gain deeper insight into problems of human prehistory. My intention is to start with two simple examples from outside Europe and then turn in more detail to three examples concerned specifically with the prehistory of Europe.

Occasionally, linguistics has been able on its own to solve, at least in its essential aspects, some particular puzzle relating to prehistoric population movements. A classic example of this concerns Malagasy, the indigenous language of the island of Madagascar. Early travellers familiar both with Madagascar and with

the East Indies were struck by the remarkable similarities between Malagasy and languages of the East Indies, similarities so frequent and detailed that they cannot be the result of chance. We now call the language family that includes Malagasy and most languages of the East Indies, also stretching further eastwards as far as Easter Island, Austronesian. Dahl (1951) provided detailed comparison showing that Malagasy is specifically most closely related to the Barito languages of the island of Borneo within the Austronesian language family; he compared Malagasy with the Barito language Ma'anyan. The similarities include basic vocabulary, such as words for 'hair' (Malagasy *volo*, Ma'anyan *wulo*) and 'I' (Malagasy *aho*, Ma'anyan *aku*), but also grammatical features such as a prefix to indicate an accidental action (Malagasy *tafa-*, Ma'anyan *tapa-*). On the basis of linguistic evidence, Dahl further estimated that the Malagasy must have left Borneo to arrive in Madagascar some time around 400 CE. Later work by archaeologists and, most recently, geneticists has served only to confirm these claims. The island of Madagascar, which is not visible from the East African mainland, shows no signs of human habitation before around 500 CE, after which there is unbroken habitation to the present. In genetic terms, the Malagasy population is basically of insular south-east Asian origin, although there has been some admixture with African populations, something seen linguistically also in loan words from African languages.

At the opposite extreme, in some other instances linguistics has at best been able to suggest a hypothesis that has gone beyond speculation only on the basis of input from other disciplines. In the mid-1980s, I did fieldwork on a previously virtually undescribed language, Haruai, spoken by about a thousand people on the northern fringes of the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. I was able to ascertain that Haruai is closely related to the neighbouring languages Hagahai and Pinai, forming a small language family called the Piawi family, but that this small family is unrelated to any other neighbouring languages, such as Kobon of the Kalam family (the language with whose speakers the Haruai




are at present in most intense contact). This suggested that the Haruai, along with speakers of the other Piawi languages, might have moved into this particular area from outside. But this remained pure speculation initially. It moved a little further forward on a linguistic basis when William A. Foley of the University of Sydney and an expert on Papuan languages suggested to me that the pronouns of Haruai show a striking similarity to those of Aru-fundi, a language spoken in Lowland Papua New Guinea and separated from Haruai by an uninhabited rugged area. Some ethnographic evidence suggested a possible Lowland origin for the Haruai, such as their traditional marriage pattern by elopement, rather than by arranged marriage as is typical of Highland populations. To this one could add some very superficial physical anthropological evidence, such as the higher stature and darker skin pigmentation of the Haruai in comparison with typical Highlanders, both of which would suggest a Lowland origin. But this time the question was resolved by genetics. As shown in detail in Bhatia et al. (1989), the Haruai population has a number of alleles (values for particular genes) that are otherwise found only in Lowland and not in Highland populations, thus providing conclusive evidence of a Lowland origin.

For my first example within Europe, I wish to turn to the south-eastern fringe of the continent, namely the Caucasus, and more specifically Azerbaijan. Linguistically, the Caucasus is an area of great diversity, indeed it was referred to by the mediaeval Arab geographers as the "Mountain of Tongues". While linguists still disagree about some of the higher-level and lower-level groupings of languages, there is an intermediate level at which there is agreement on the language families represented. There are languages of the Indo-European family, which covers most of Europe and parts of south-western Asia and South Asia, with two main branches represented, Armenian and Iranian, the latter through such languages as Ossetian. There are Turkic languages in the Caucasus, including Azerbaijani. Finally, there are the so-called Caucasian languages, i.e. languages indigenous to the Caucasus

but not closely related to languages outside this area. In fact, the term "Caucasian languages" subsumes three language families whose relations to one another remain controversial: the Kartvelian or South Caucasian languages, whose best known member is Georgian; the North-West or West Caucasian languages, such as Abaza and Kabardo-Cherkessian (Circassian); and the North-East or East Caucasian languages, such as Chechen, Ingush and Dargi.

From the historical record, it is known that Turkic languages, including the ancestor of what we now know as Azerbaijani, entered the Caucasus within the last thousand years. But the precise way in which Azerbaijani came to be the dominant language of Azerbaijan remains unclear. Did Turkic speakers replace the previous population completely (for instance, killing or expelling them) or partially (for instance, killing or expelling the men only), or did they rather form a small elite which gradually assimilated the existing population linguistically, a process known as language shift since the pioneering work of Thomason and Kaufman (1988)? Until recently, there has been little beyond speculation to answer this question. But recent work in genetics suggests a clear answer.

mtDNA Variation in the Caucasus



Nasidze and Stoneking (2001) examine the mitochondrial DNA, i.e. DNA which is transmitted by the mother, of a number of populations indigenous to the Caucasus, in comparison with populations of other parts of Europe and other groups in the Middle East. Figure 1 is one way of partially representing their findings: the horizontal axis represents the first principal component of the genetic variation found, i.e. the cluster of features that accounts for most of the genetic variation. The distribution along this axis shows that populations indigenous to the Caucasus, though exhibiting substantial internal variation — more than found in the rest of Europe put together, in fact — nonetheless occupy a homogeneous segment of the axis between other European populations on the one hand and Middle Eastern populations on the other. Crucial to the question posed above, Azerbaijani-speaking populations fall well within this range, and are markedly distinct from populations outside the Caucasus speaking related Turkic languages, such as Turks (in Turkey). In other words, there was no change in physical population (or at least, of the female population) that accompanied the spread of Turkic languages to Azerbaijan; that is, we are looking at an instance of language shift rather than an instance of population replacement. Ongoing work using Y-chromosomal DNA, which traces the male line, suggests a similar picture for the male population too. While the combined linguistic and genetic evidence provides a clear solution to the particular issue at hand, this example is also of importance for more general methodological reasons. In a sense, the linguistic and genetic data point in different directions: the former to the Turkic language family, the latter to indigenous populations of the Caucasus. When we find this kind of discrepancy, it is important not to try and squeeze one set of data into the pattern suggested by the other. Rather, both sets of data must be combined into an overall consistent account, and when linguistic and genetic classifications diverge in this way, we have at least *prima facie* evidence that the solution is language shift.

Most present-day languages of Europe belong to the Indo-Euro-

pean family, with Basque in the Pyrenees the only clear survival of the pre-Indo-European scene. At some point within the past few thousand years, Indo-European languages entered Europe. But most details beyond this have been controversial. Given recent information coming from both archaeology and genetics, it is worth investigating whether the Indo-Europeanization of Europe can be correlated with any of the major changes that have taken place in the archaeological or genetic record. The archaeological record shows agriculture, more specifically domesticated crops, entering Europe from the south-east (from Anatolia) starting about 9,000 years ago, and advancing at an average rate of 1 kilometre per year. Can this event, which marks the shift from the Palaeolithic to the Neolithic in Europe, be correlated with the continent's Indo-Europeanization, as suggested for instance by Renfrew (1987)? The genetic picture is more complex and more controversial, but recent work does show at least some gene flow from the south-east entering Europe at around the same time, including both mitochondrial DNA and Y-chromosomal DNA (Sykes, 1999; Semino et al., 2000; Chikhi et al., 2002), and which can thus plausibly be correlated with the introduction of agriculture. The main problem is that geneticists have not yet reached agreement on the relative percentages of Palaeolithic and Neolithic genes comprising the present-day European gene pool; estimates range from 80% Palaeolithic and 20% Neolithic (Sykes, 1999; Semino et al., 2000) to 30% Palaeolithic and 70% Neolithic (Chikhi et al., 2002), although there is agreement that the proportion of Palaeolithic is higher in the north-west than in the south-east of the continent. But at least we can say that some substantial part of the current gene pool entered at around the same time as agriculture. Now, can this be correlated with the entry of Indo-European languages?

Linguistics does not dispose of a reliable, generally accepted method of dating that will work at such time depths, but in combination with more detailed data from archaeology, linguistic evidence can be used to address this question, and in what follows

(an abbreviated version of the argument expounded in Comrie (in press)) I will try to outline the argument against identifying the Indo-Europeanization of Europe with either the introduction of agriculture or the strong gene flows of around the same period. The basic linguistic technique is so-called linguistic palaeontology, also called linguistic archaeology, which consists in seeing whether the terms for particular concepts can reliably be reconstructed to the common ancestor language of a group of languages. In the case of Indo-European, we are asking whether we can reconstruct, for instance, agricultural terminology back to Proto-Indo-European. The basic methodology requires us to test whether the relevant concepts are expressed by means of reasonably regularly related words in a sufficient number of the attested languages to make it plausible that a particular word with a particular meaning can be reconstructed back to the ancestor language. In the case of Indo-European agricultural vocabulary, sufficient items can be reliably reconstructed in this way to make it clear that the speakers of Proto-Indo-European were familiar with agriculture. This applies both to animal husbandry and to cereal crops. Crucial to the former is a distinction between words for 'domestic animal' and 'wild animal', and also a verb meaning 'to tame'. Crucial to the latter is a word meaning 'grain' (and perhaps more narrowly 'barley', though this is less secure), and verbs meaning 'to sow' and 'to plough'. (For more details, reference can be made to the article *Agriculture* and more detailed topic articles in Mallory & Adams (1997).)

But the presence of a verb 'to plough' calls for more detailed consideration. First, let us consider carefully what it means to reconstruct this verb back to Proto-Indo-European, the ancestor language of the Indo-European languages. It means that the Proto-Indo-European speaking community was familiar with the plough before the community had split up into different individual branches and languages. Now, archaeological information relating to the plough comes into play here. The earliest attestation of the plough in Europe is from around 6,000 years before the

present — the evidence is not in the form of preserved ploughs (unlikely given that the earliest ploughs would have been made of wood), but rather in the form of distinct marks in the ground that are indicative of ploughing. Since the Proto-Indo-European community was familiar with the plough, Indo-European languages could not have entered Europe before the attestation of the plough, in other words before about 6,000 years ago, well after the dates of 9,000 years ago for the introduction of agriculture and for the major recent gene flows from the south-east.

All this adds up to a picture in which the Indo-Europeanization of Europe occurred considerably later than the initial introduction of agriculture, considerably later than the last major gene flows into Europe. It suggests that the Indo-Europeanization of Europe was primarily a movement of languages rather than a movement of people, the new language or languages being perhaps the speech of an initially small elite that gradually attracted more and more of the earlier inhabitants as they underwent language shift. A number of details remain open — for instance, what advantage did the speakers of Indo-European languages have that enabled them to form an elite? — but at least we have made progress in narrowing down the range of questions that need to be asked.

As my last example I want to look at a situation where linguistics is able to provide limited, suggestive information, but on which population studies may well be able to throw further light. At the time of the Roman occupation of Britain, the island was overwhelmingly Celtic-speaking, indeed with the exception of the Romans themselves and perhaps the Picts in the north-east of Scotland, the whole island was probably covered by a single "British" language; the poems that are not considered the oldest poems in the Welsh language were probably actually composed in Strathclyde (the area around the present-day Scottish city of Glasgow). Within a few hundred years of the collapse of Roman power in Britain in the early fifth century CE, most of southern Britain, more specifically England and southern Scotland, had become

English-speaking, with only Wales remaining largely Celtic-speaking to the present day; the Celtic language of Cornwall died out probably in the early nineteenth century, that of Cumbria in the north-west of England some time in the Middle Ages. (At the same time, the British language in northern Scotland was replaced by an incoming language from Ireland, whose present-day descendant is known as Scots Gaelic.) Once again, the question poses itself, what exactly happened during the Anglicization of England: Did invading Anglo-Saxons replace the existing Celtic population? Or did they form an elite that gradually assimilated the local Celtic-speaking population? Or was the scenario somewhere between these extremes? History tells us little, although historians have surmised that Celtic speech may have survived longer in the north of England (even excluding the special case of Cumbria).

One piece of linguistic evidence is from place names, which often provide evidence of the earlier occupation of an area by speakers of another language. When I turn to my native area of north-eastern England, most place names are of English origin, but I want to look at evidence provided by two specific examples, the village of Cambois near Blyth on the Northumberland coast, and the village of Walworth near Darlington in the south of County Durham (Robinson, 1999). Most place names near Blyth are English in origin (with Blyth itself coming from a word meaning 'happy'), with occasional Scandinavian names reflecting Viking visits and settlements, such as a reef called the Green Skeer (compare Danish *skær* 'rock'). Cambois, pronounced /'kæm's/, is exceptional in that it is clearly of Celtic origin, deriving from a Celtic word meaning 'bay'. It thus provides evidence of earlier Celtic settlement, although the original meaning of the word has long since been forgotten, as can be seen from the fact that the bay on which Cambois is located is called Cambois Bay, etymologically 'bay bay'. But this does not really answer our question of whether the Anglicization of this area involved language shift or population replacement, since place names can survive even a major change of population, as witness the persistence of indigenous

place names like Mississippi (Algonquian for 'big water') in North America. *Walworth* might at first seem even less relevant, since the name is clearly of English origin, but what is important here is its meaning: the second part, *worth*, means 'enclosed farmstead', the first part 'of the Welsh', using the term that the Anglo-Saxons applied to the Celtic inhabitants of their new homeland. In other words, even into the time when English-speakers were giving English names to settlements, at least one settlement was identified as being inhabited by an ethnically distinct group. So there was some survival of Celts into the Anglo-Saxon settlement of north-eastern England.

In cases of language shift, one often finds that features of the formerly spoken language percolate into the new language. A clear recent example is the persistence of features of the Celtic language Irish into the English of Ireland, so-called Hiberno-English, as the result of the massive language shift from Irish to English that has taken place over the last two centuries. In Hiberno-English one finds expressions like

"... you'd have as much chance o' movin' Fluther as a tune on a dead whistle would move a deaf man an' he dead."

from Sean O'Casey's *The Plough and the Stars*, where the final *an' he dead* ('if he were dead') makes no sense in terms of other varieties of English but follows a pattern that is regular in Irish, as in sentences like *tháinig Seán agus é ólta* 'John arrived while drunk', more literally '... and he drunk', with the use of *and* to introduce an attendant circumstance. While Northern dialects of English do not show anything like Celtic influence on the scale of Hiberno-Irish, there is none the less at least one construction, the so-called Northern Subject Rule, that might just reflect such influence from the earlier British language.

In Northern dialects of English, although the rules for verb agreement are in general more or less the same as in the standard language (e.g. *he runs, John runs, they run*), there is one important

difference: where standard English has *the boys run*, Northern dialects have *the boys runs*. Crucially, this difference holds only when the subject is non-pronominal: contrast *the boys runs*, but *they run*, with a pronominal subject. A parallel phenomenon is found in Welsh. In Welsh, if the subject is a pronoun, then one has consistent agreement, as in the opposition between *y mae ef* 'he is' and *y maent hwy* 'they are', where *y* is a sentence initial particle, *mae* and *maent* forms of the verb 'to be', and *ef* and *hwy* the subject pronouns. If the subject is non-pronominal, we have in the singular the expected *y mae 'r bachgen* 'the boy is', but in the plural the verb appears in the singular form, *y mae 'r bechgyn* 'the boys are', with a distribution exactly paralleling that found in Northern dialects of English.

The linguistic evidence is just enough to be tantalizing, but not really enough to be convincing. Will evidence from population genetics be able to resolve the issue? I certainly hope so, although we are at a time depth where it is not easy to resolve the population genetic evidence, especially given that we are dealing with two north-west European populations, perhaps too close to be distinguished clearly by methods that work well at greater time-depths, such as studying mutations in mitochondrial and Y-chromosome DNA, but perhaps at a time depth too distant to be usefully investigated by the methods used in forensic identification. So here we have a problem case where linguistics has probably gone as far as it can, and where we can only hope that other disciplines, like population genetics, will be able to step in.

In conclusion, I have tried to show how linguistics, in combination with other disciplines, especially archaeology and genetics, can provide solutions to problems in the area of human prehistory, problems that in many cases would not be soluble given only the insights from one discipline. Methodologically, it is important that the evidence from the different disciplines be gathered independently and then combined in order to provide an overall account. Linguistic evidence should not be used blindly to make claims about genetics or vice versa: genes are transmitted biologi-

cally, while languages are transmitted socially, so that they provide different windows whose independent views must subsequently be combined to provide a consistent account. One cannot tell from examining an uninscribed pot, plough or other archaeological find what language was spoken by its creator, but again such evidence can sometimes be combined with linguistic evidence to provide a crucial insight into prehistory. More specifically with regard to Europe, I hope to have shown the extent to which the prehistory of the continent combines continuity and innovation, a combination that is surely also important for Europe's future.

References

- Bhatia, Kuldeep, Carol Jenkins, Madhuri Prasad, George Koki & Julie Lombange. 1989. 'Immunogenetic studies of two recently contacted populations from Papua New Guinea'. *Human Biology* 61, 1: 45–64.
- Chikhi, Lounès, Richard A. Nichols, Guido Barbujani, & Mark A. Beaumont. 2002. 'Y genetic data support the Neolithic demic diffusion model'. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 99: 11008–11013.
- Comrie, Bernard. In press. 'Farming dispersal in Europe and the spread of the Indo-European language family'. *Examining the Farming/Language Dispersal Hypothesis*, Peter Bellwood & Colin Renfrew (eds.). Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research.
- Dahl, Otto Chr. 1951. *Malgache et Maanjan: une comparaison linguistique* (Avhandlinger utgitt av Egede-Instituttet 3). Oslo: Egede-Instituttet
- Mallory, J.P. & D.Q. Adams. 1997. *Encyclopedia of Indo-European Culture*. London & Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn.
- Nasidze, Ivan & Mark Stoneking. 2001. 'Mitochondrial DNA variation and language replacements in the Caucasus'. *Proceedings Royal Society London B* 268: 1197–1206.
- Renfrew, Colin. 1987. *Archaeology and Language: The Puzzle of Indo-European Origins*. London: Jonathan Cape.
- Robinson, Ian. 1999. *From Abberwick to Yetlington: The place names of North-East England*. Durham: GP Electronic Services.
- Semino, Ornella, Giuseppe Passarino, Peter J. Oefner, Alice A. Lin, Svetlana Arbu-

zova, Lars E. Beckman, Giovanna De Benedictis, Paolo Francalacci, Anastasia Kouvasi, Svetlana Limborska, Mladen Marcikic, Anna Mika, Barbara Mika, Dragan Primorac, A. Silvana Santachiara-Benerecetti, L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, Peter A. Underhill. 2000. 'The genetic legacy of Paleolithic *Homo sapiens sapiens* in extant Europeans: a Y chromosome perspective'. *Science* 290:1155–1159.

Sykes, Bryan. 1999. 'Using genes to map population structure and origins'. *The Human Inheritance: Genes, Language, and Evolution*, Brian Sykes (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 93–117.

Thomason, Sarah Grey & Terrence Kaufman. 1988. *Language Contact, Creolization, and Genetic Linguistics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

History and Identity: Mediaeval Frontiers and the Formation of Europe

By NORA BEREND

Dr Nora Berend is assistant lecturer in mediaeval history at the University of Cambridge. Her book, *At the Gate of Christendom: Jews, Muslims and 'Pagans' in Medieval Hungary (c. 1000–c. 1300)*, Cambridge University Press, 2001, received the Royal Historical Society's Gladstone Prize for 2001. She has also published articles on mediaeval social and religious topics, and edited a book, *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, Ashgate, 2002.

We tend to tacitly assume that the framework for writing history is a national one: nobody is surprised to find books on the prehistory of nation-states, the rise of nation-states and their modern history. Not only do nations have a history but, partly by virtue of that history, they also have an identity. Probably all of us have experienced some version of official national history, taught in school. People, of course, do not necessarily identify with the official history; and there are many forms of local rather than national identity. Even if they do not accept it, however, citizens of any country absorb what they assume to be historical information. Often, this information as it relates to the national past is at best distorted and at worst a myth. Nevertheless, mythical identities do generate very real dangers: it is enough to think of the world wars, genocides and ethnic cleansing to realize how real these dangers are. As Eric Hobsbawm wrote, it is the duty of historians to debunk such national myths.¹

In order to debunk myths, we need to understand how they developed in the first place, how and why reality is subtly distorted, and confront such myths with the reality we can unearth through historical investigation. Using one example of research in progress, I should like first to indicate how historians today can work towards this goal. I shall then shed light on these processes by focusing on one detailed example: the mediaeval creation and modern reuse of the identity of being the defender of Christendom, presenting the results of research I have already completed.

First, though, some thoughts on the incorporation of Scandinavia and Central Europe into Latin Christendom. This is a collaborative project I have just started together with over a dozen participants (historians, archaeologists and art historians) from the countries involved. It is an exercise in unpicking the national myths concerning the beginnings of states; and it is particularly relevant here and now, as it concerns the birth of Europe. There are two main interpretative frameworks through which historians have explained the rapid expansion of Latin Christendom around 1000: either German influence or the action of individual rulers who decided that in order to save their people, they had to convert and join the more advanced world of Christendom. The story is always told through the lens of national history. Yet if one considers that so many different areas underwent similar developments, converting and forming new political units around the same time, it becomes clear that a local explanation is not sufficient. Rulers of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Bohemia, Hungary and Poland converted and enforced the Christianization of their peoples. In all areas, there is evidence for prior missions or other contacts with Christianity; in many, there were so-called pagan rebellions against the Christian ruler, always linked to political aims. We have now started to compare the process of conversion methodically; using such comparison, we can show similarities as well as local specificities. It is already clear that many of the differences do not pertain to countries, but to smaller areas within countries. Conversion and state-formation were regional, not




Nora
Berend

national trends, and these histories must be written in a comparative manner. In this way, we can recreate historical processes without being fettered by a preconceived framework, that of the nation-state—the "us" versus "them".

I shall now talk about some results concerning the relationship between history and identity, based on my own research. From the 19th century onwards one finds the idea (still held in varying degrees by many people) that a European country or nation, having defended the West for centuries against a variety of enemies (pagans or infidels, barbarians, tyrants or political enemies) and thereby ensured peaceful and unhindered economic and political development for the West, was economically backward as a result, perhaps even politically backward, and/or threatened in its very existence by enemies. Yet in its hour of need, the country was completely ignored by an ungrateful West. One could probably name a dozen or so different countries, all of which would fit this description, as the same idea—or, I would argue, ideology—developed in a range of countries in the Balkans, in Eastern and Central Europe, and in Spain. I shall now focus on three of these where very similar arguments appeared in national histories, and where the roots of this ideology ultimately go back to the 13th-14th centuries.

Let me begin by talking about Poland, where this ideology was perhaps most pervasive and therefore taken as an evident truth until very recently, when Janusz Tazbir wrote a book about the myth of Poland as rampart.² I base this part of my paper on his work. Polish identity came to centre around the country as the *przedmurze*, or rampart, of Europe. In not dissimilar terms, 19th-century writers with a great variety of political views stressed the notion that while Poland had defended Europe for centuries so that European society and culture could develop, Europe had abandoned Poland:

*"Europe repays with ingratitude
The moans of our brothers for her salvation*

*When she forgets that Poland as its strong rampart
Repelled the Eastern storms from the rest of the world."
- in the words of an early 19th-century preacher.*

"Poland was the rampart against the Asian hosts" and, as a result, "in the womb of Europe, human rights, religion, arts and knowledge of various kinds useful in social life could be preserved." Europe, thus indebted to Poland, should repay her by restoring Polish independence—in the words of an early 19th-century left-wing author.

Quotations like these could be continued endlessly: as it became clear by the early 19th century that Poland could not defend itself independently, the idea that Europe should offer help in return for Poland's earlier services became a commonplace. Europe was accused of ingratitude: repaying Poland for her self-sacrifice by partitioning the country, committing a crime against "a nation which had saved civilization and Christendom from the Tatars at Legnica [1241], from the Ottomans at Hotin [1621, 1673] and Vienna [1683], and for so many years had protected it from the Muscovite rabble." This view of the Polish past became very popular. It included rewriting the past, and forgetting that during most of the 17th century Poland avoided hostilities with the Ottomans and in fact even used Tatar military aid against Christian opponents. Poland was also now seen as constantly engaged in *defence* rather than offensives or wars of conquest. And finally, Poland was seen as *unique*: only Poland was a bastion of Christendom, a defender of European civilization. During the 19th century, as political conflicts between Poland and Russia as well as Poland and Germany grew, anti-Russian and anti-German interpretations of the rampart ideology also appeared: Poland was now portrayed as having protected Europe against schismatics (orthodox Russia), despotism and the Teutonic Knights. France, England and, in the 20th century, even the USA were thus seen as being bound by an obligation to restore and help Poland, which had protected them since the 13th century. According to this view of history, Poland's heroic

past also contributed to a troubled present. Poland did not really participate in the great epochs of European civilization. The theory of "civilizational youth" was advanced as an explanation for everything: "we bore the burden of centuries of invasions by barbarian peoples... at the cost of our own advances in civilization". That is, the *reason* Poland lagged behind in economic, industrial and political development is *because* it served as the rampart for Europe. The Tatar and Ottoman invasions caused Poland's long-lasting backwardness. These views pervaded not just history-writing but historical novels, historical painting and poetry: they became the substructure of Polish culture, which became intertwined with Catholicism in the idea of a Polish national mission of defending *Catholic* Europe. Although socialist critics in Poland attacked the idea of the Polish rampart as clerical propaganda (blaming the gentry as the most destructive social force) from the late 19th century, this attack did not have a deep impact. Rather, the main difference remained one of interpreting Poland's role as rampart. While some thought that Poland's role as the rampart of Europe was proof of the grace of God, for others it was a trap with tragic consequences, weakening Poland. In the 20th century, the rampart continued to be the main discourse for Catholics and Marxists alike. Indeed, it infiltrated Polish consciousness to such an extent that the idea of Poland's uniqueness in this respect is a commonplace for the Poles themselves. When I told a friend, who—although Polish by origin—left Poland at the age of 12 and has since lived in Western Europe and the USA, that I was working on the idea of *Hungary* as the rampart of Christendom, she exclaimed: but that is *Poland!* How better to illustrate the influence of the myth of Poland's uniqueness than by reference to Tazbir himself? He has done most to debunk the myth of Poland as rampart. He highlighted how Poland, in the mediaeval and early modern periods, was very far from being the only one to be in the path of Mongol, Ottoman and other attacks. Yet even he failed to see that Poland was not unique in creating the modern-day *myth* of the rampart either: "The tradition of the rampart of Christendom

played hardly any role in the development of Hungarian historical consciousness in the 19th century... And in the next century, none of the historians dreamed of connecting later history with the fact that for a certain time their nation played a role of rampart."

Nothing could be further from the truth; and in order to show that, let me now turn to the Hungarian example.³ During the 19th century, it was taken for granted that Hungary had been the shield of Christian Europe against first the Mongols in the 13th century, then the Ottomans in the 15th-17th centuries: indeed, stopped them at the cost of sacrificing herself, a large part of Hungary having been under Ottoman rule for 150 years. This sort of view was part of the curriculum in elementary schools, and generations grew up learning it as a self-evident fact, and as a particularly glorious aspect of national history. It was only from the 1930s that some studies appeared on the development of the notion of rampart, and even these were cautious investigations, as the issue went to the heart of Hungarian national consciousness. The most influential early 20th-century interpretation of Hungary's development stated that until the Ottoman conquest Hungarian social and economic development proceeded along the same lines as that of Western Europe: it was because Hungary was the shield of Christian Europe that the country fell behind and entered the modern age as a backward country, agricultural rather than industrialized, and lacking a middle-class. The peace treaty of Trianon after the first World War, which entailed the loss of large areas regarded by Hungarians as part of the national territory, was seen as an injustice: the deed of a Western Europe ungrateful for the protection Hungary had provided. Whereas in Poland the national grievance was connected with the 18th-century partitions, in Hungary it centred primarily around World War I. With these losses, national history and national myths became more precious: the obstinate protection of the idea of ancient greatness included the emphasis on Hungary's role as rampart, just as much as with Poland. In Poland and Hungary, therefore, the modern political situation engendered the birth and perpetu-

ation of myth. Also, in both countries it was an integral part of the myth to emphasize the unique fate of the country in question. So Hungarians also saw themselves as having been alone in defending Christendom and as now being mistreated by an ungrateful Europe that had forgotten all about Hungary's sufferings.

Let me now turn to Spain, where modern myths relating to Iberia's role on the frontier have been more complex. The historiographical tradition has been analyzed by Peter Linehan, and there is now a steadily growing literature in Spanish.⁴ Beginning in the 16th century, a Spanish consciousness started to emerge, the cornerstones of which were a sense of messianic destiny of the monarchy (later transferred to the Spanish nation) linked to religiosity and military ability. The *Reyes Católicos* were the manifestations of what later came to be seen as the "essence" of Spanish national character, a military defence of the faith and the Church. In the 17th century Spanish writers berated the French for their alliance with the Ottomans and saw this as proof of the superiority of the faith among Spaniards. The mythical identity of Spaniards as pure Christians was propagated for centuries, despite the fact that until the 16th century Jews and Muslims were part of Iberian society. The significance of the frontiers separating Christians from others and defining Spanish identity only started to be questioned in the 20th century; xenophobe nationalism had been the form of national identity, understood to have been formed through centuries of Christian Reconquest. The mission or destiny that was at the core of 19th and much of 20th-century Spanish nationalism resembles the Polish and Hungarian one in some ways, but it was more triumphalist, emphasizing Christian successes. The historical figure of the adventurer and warlord El Cid (Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar), who in real life switched sides between Christians and Muslims, in his reincarnation of tireless Christian hero who never ceased to fight the Muslims, even leading a battle after death, tied to his horse, came to be seen as "the typical frontiersman" by the 20th century. His "story" was also captured on film, with one of the leading Spanish mediaevalists

acting as advisor. The Middle Ages were turned into the period of the birth of the Spanish nation. Despite debates about the origins of the nation, in-depth questioning of the Christian myth did not take place until after the fall of Franco. Ironically, in fact, during the Spanish Civil War there was impetus from both sides to reinforce this myth. Francoist ideology quickly appropriated the role of continuing the Spanish national mission—statehood and Catholicism were "naturally" linked now. Yet even on the Republican side, as the words of Ay Carmela remind us, reference to fighting against the Moors was used to designate the anti-Francoist war. Under Franco, national Catholicism froze into the official ideology. In the late 20th century, the demystification of the Reconquista began. However, albeit in a negative way, even that could lead to emphasizing the uniqueness of Spain, as the country responsible for the first European colony, the start of colonialism, or the Reconquista as a negative influence, causing backwardness. Thus, while some historians now try to demonstrate that there was nothing distinct about Spanish mediaeval society, the last vestiges of Spanish uniqueness still linger, probably unrecognized by their proponents.

19th and 20th-century nationalism took up the mediaeval past in all three countries and spun it into a myth about the country having been the champion of Europe, Christendom, civilization and freedom, and therefore the holder of a glorious past. These myths evolved and went from strength to strength when the real power of the countries in question was nonexistent or weak. In other words, these national myths were compensations. Let me now take you back several centuries into the Middle Ages, when—so these modern ideologies claim—Poles, Hungarians and Spaniards defended Christian Europe.⁵ In the Middle Ages, all three areas lay in the contact zones between Christianity and other cultures and religions. The areas bordering Christian lands were populated on the one hand by various nomadic peoples who held animistic beliefs (these were seen as pagans by mediaeval Christians) and on the other hand by Muslims.

"If Hungary is occupied by the Tatars, it will be an open gate for them towards other Catholic regions" wrote King Béla IV of Hungary to the Pope in the middle of the 13th century. The background was the Mongol invasion that overran the kingdom in 1241-42. The Hungarians were defeated, and the king had to escape to a small island off the Adriatic coast. The Mongols plundered the kingdom, took many of those inhabitants they did not kill as captives and finally withdrew. The king claimed that the Mongols would return; indeed, that they intended to conquer the whole of Christendom (and he used this term as a synonym for Europe) once they established their base in Hungary. He referred to Attila the Hun who came from the East and subjugated the West, making his headquarters in the territory that later became Hungary. (From the 12th century on, the city of Old Buda was identified with Attila's town.) Béla wrote that at the time of the invasion the Pope and Christian kings did not help Hungary; his neighbours provided no aid, he received only words. In this way the king justified royal policies of dynastic marriages with non-Catholics like Kievan Rus' and even with the Cumans, who were a pagan nomadic people, but potential allies against the Mongols. Béla also threatened the Pope that he would make an alliance with the Mongols themselves, if necessary, in order to save his country from a new onslaught. The fact that Béla's son was married to a Cuman woman lent weight to his threat of a marriage alliance between another of his children and the Mongols. Hungary, Béla argued, was the gate of Christendom: the entry-point, or, alternatively, the place where the invaders could be stopped, if the king received help. Béla thus emphasized the fragility of the kingdom, stating that after the invasion, the population of Hungary would be unable and unwilling to resist another Mongol attack, already aware that they could not withstand it on their own. The image of the "gate" was rich in significance in Christian culture, symbolizing the entry to the other world; at the same time the term was also used to designate physical entry-points of various kinds, to estates, fortifications and so on. Béla's aim was to get pa-

pal help. He asked for financial aid as well as for royal control over ecclesiastics, and he did not fail to use this argument in conflicts with the papacy during the rest of his reign. The help he demanded was not necessarily connected with defence against the Mongols. For example, he argued that the Pope had to approve the king's choice as the next archbishop. Everything in the interest of the king was depicted as being in the interest of Christendom, which Hungary defended. The king compared the cause of defending Hungary to the Crusades to the Holy Land and concluded that the loss of all Eastern Latin territories would not harm Christendom as much as the fall of Hungary. Béla could play on fears concerning the return of the Mongols—fears shared by the popes. Although his letter was based on the reality of Mongol devastation, it did not include other, equally relevant aspects of that reality. For all the rhetoric of the defence of Christendom, Béla pursued a pragmatic policy of settling and relying on pagan nomads (the Cumans) to build royal power. He even deployed their warriors against Christian neighbours. He tried to benefit both from the presence of the Cumans and from the concessions he hoped to receive from the papacy. In short, the ideology expressed in this letter was formulated so as to strengthen royal power, and was all the more potent for being based on the ecclesiastical ideology of Christendom advocated by the popes themselves.

The case of Poland is very similar, yet differs on one crucial point. Various neighbouring pagan tribes were seen as enemies of Christendom. Then the country was devastated by the Mongols at exactly the same time as Hungary. Papal letters show that in the 13th century, and especially after the mid-century Mongol invasion, Poland was encouraged to fight against the pagans, and the fight was seen as a common Christian cause. The defence of Poland was also the defence of other Christians; the Mongols could traverse Poland and attack other countries. Yet we do not find, in the 13th century, the idea that Poland's position on Christendom's frontier entitled it to special rights; this ideology only appeared in Poland in the 14th century. Why? The difference be-

tween Hungary and Poland was one of royal power: whereas in the 13th century Hungary was unified under one monarch, Poland was fragmented between many princes. And it was exactly when Poland became unified that the ideological use of Christendom's defence appeared. Ladislaus the Short, who unified Poland, used this argument in 1323 as the justification of incorporating Halicz-Vladimir as a shield defending Poland. The next king, Casimir the Great (r. 1333-1370) justified the interests of the Kingdom of Poland as the interests of Christendom. He thus received papal authorization to retain part of the ecclesiastical revenues, to use them in the defence of the kingdom. This defence of territory was also depicted as a defence of the honour of the Church. Casimir wrote in very similar terms to those of Béla IV of Hungary: Poland being on the furthest frontiers of Christendom, it was the most exposed to attack. Its defence benefited all faithful and the king therefore had to be helped (financially and by other concessions) by the papacy. This new identity of Poland as defender of Christendom helped Casimir in the process of royal centralization. This new rhetoric should not make us forget that in fact rulers of Poland also continued to make use of pagan auxiliaries (including Mongols), often in battles against Christian neighbours. From the 15th century onwards, Polish rulers routinely invoked Poland's role as the rampart (*antemurale*) of Christendom, while making alliances with pagans against the Teutonic Order.

In a completely different part of Europe, the Iberian Peninsula, a very similar ideology was created at the royal court. Here, the fight against the Muslims—who had settled the Peninsula from the 8th century on—led to spectacular successes in the 13th century. By the middle of that century, most of the Peninsula had come under Christian dominion. Here the notion of defending and expanding Christendom's frontiers turned into the ideology of the Reconquest, that is, the claim that Christians, as the rightful heirs of the peninsula, were taking lands back from the Muslims. By the 13th century, both kings and popes shared a common

vocabulary of Reconquest. The two 13th-century kings who played the most important role in the conquests, James I of Aragon and (St) Ferdinand III of Castile, both used the argument of fighting for Christendom. Their arguments were buttressed by a spectacular, victorious expansion of their realms, and for the most part popes were ready to concede what they asked for. With a few temporary exceptions, popes from the late 11th century onwards acknowledged the role of Iberians and, increasingly, that of their kings, as defenders of Christendom. This defence was in fact successful expansion. Pope Urban II in 1088 celebrated King Alfonso VI as having liberated the church of Toledo from Muslims; similarly in 1255, Pope Alexander IV celebrated the deeds of King Ferdinand III in extending the Christian cult. So it comes as no surprise that Iberian kings started to capitalize on such recognition and demanded the use of ecclesiastical revenues (then appropriating them with increasing ease), supposedly for purposes of defence and expansion, but often for other aims; they also intervened in ecclesiastical elections. Ferdinand III equated the defence of his kingdom with the defence of Christendom. The rulers sometimes also talked about the threat of Muslim invasion from North Africa in order to reinforce their claims. At the same time, just as we have seen in the case of Hungary and Poland, there is plenty of evidence for peaceful interaction with and royal employment of Muslims; so again, rhetoric only focused on one side of reality. Sometimes kings went further than the claim for financial help. Thus James I of Aragon told his confessor, when the latter was reluctant to absolve him of the sin of adultery, that God would surely forgive him his extramarital relations, James having served God so well through the reconquest of Christian lands. How much the religious reference point was emphasized as an ideological framework, in relations with the outside world especially, while other arguments were often deployed for domestic consumption, is well illustrated by a mediaeval Spanish chronicle, the *Estoria de España*. Written in the late 13th century, it gives a fictitious account of two speeches delivered by King Alfonso VIII

of Castile on the eve of the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212), which was celebrated as one of the greatest Christian victories over the Muslims. Alfonso speaks separately, first to those coming from various parts of the Iberian Peninsula, then to the "ultramontanes": Italians, Germans and French. To the first he says "we are all Spaniards"; he emphasizes that it is a war to regain lands unjustly taken by Muslims, and Christians have to take revenge. To those who came from outside the Peninsula, however, Alfonso says "we are all one in Christianity and the Church". All have been harmed by Muslim victories; revenge will honour all of Christendom. We can thus see the adaptation of the rhetoric to the audience.

The key concept in this ideology was the defence of Christendom, often expressed as the defence of Christian frontiers. Christendom in fact did not have linear, military frontiers at the time; even kingdoms did not have that sort of frontier yet. Nonetheless, the concept of frontiers existed, as did the practice of delimitation on a smaller scale. In all three countries, estates and villages were delimited by the 12th-13th centuries. This meant that the king's or lord's officials went around the estate, with a charter subsequently being drawn up, giving a detailed description of the trees, stones, streams or rivers as well as artificial border-markers that were set up, thus marking out clearly a precise linear frontier. During the period when the ideology of Christendom's defence was elaborated, the notion of linear frontiers began to be applied to whole kingdoms. I shall give two examples. In Hungary, the chronicle of the Hungarian Anonymous (late 12th or early 13th century) gave a fictitious account of one of the first rulers of Hungary drawing the frontiers of the kingdom; he used words (e.g. *meta*) and described a process that one would find in the actual delimitation of estates. In Iberia, rulers began to draw up treaties in which they divided—in advance—the areas they were going to conquer. They projected frontiers onto the lands they did not yet hold. So the ideology of the defence of Christendom was born in the conjunction of territorial frontiers on a small scale; the notion

of such frontiers on a larger scale around kingdoms and around Christendom itself; and the centralization of royal power.

In all three cases that I have talked about, the ruler made use of Christian ideology to strengthen his power vis-à-vis the Pope in order to claim concessions and rights. Each claimed to be the most important frontier of Christendom. The aim of these kings—to be able to use ecclesiastical revenues, intervene in ecclesiastical elections, thus securing the selection of their own candidate, and to be able to justify various other deeds—was common to all 13th and 14th-century kings in Europe: it was the age of centralizing monarchies. But the rulers of the kingdoms I have described had a different *means* at their disposal: the ideology of Christendom's defence. This ideology was first propagated by the papacy, claiming papal leadership of Christendom. If the Pope accepted the legitimacy of a royal claim and recognized a king as the defender of Christendom, he could give privileges, the same that were given to Crusaders, and material help. And because this ideology ultimately went back to papal initiative, it was a particularly potent tool in securing papal approval, even if it did not work in every case.

We can see then that, before national frontiers were created as permanent lines in practice, frontiers were invented as part of royal and ecclesiastical ideology. This ideological creation of a Christian frontier was in the service of power struggles between kings and popes. It had a very specific context; and the ideology itself masked part of the reality, such as peaceful interaction with the so-called enemies of Christendom, and their employment by the same kings who spoke of being defenders of Christendom.

This context, however, was entirely lost in the course of the nationalist re-use of the same imagery in the 19th century. The ideology of the defence of Christendom was taken at face value, as a fact, and new myths were built around it. The formation of identities on the European periphery in the modern period should be contrasted with the formation of identities in the frontier zones of mediaeval Christendom. Modern ideology in this respect was

self-regarding or self-pitying, whereas the mediaeval ideology was a tool in royal diplomacy.

It is also clear that there were common structures in the development of different countries. And while there were differences, too, Poland, Hungary and Spain nonetheless demonstrate clear similarities in both their mediaeval development and modern ideologies.

What sort of more general conclusions can we draw on the basis of these results? I would like to emphasize three points. First, the importance of *comparative* history. Entirely different vistas can open up: we can arrive at new interpretations by comparing, and therefore understanding, common processes. Only by realizing what is similar are we also able to appreciate what is truly unique and local. The second point follows from this: historians cannot always work alone. Team work, so commonplace in the sciences, so rare in history, should become a more vital part of historical research. Monographs are not dead of course; but many topics cannot be adequately covered by one person alone, because some comparisons would call for skills beyond the abilities of any one person. Thirdly, I should like to close with a thought on the use of history. "No lessons, it is said, can be learned from history because history, unlike science, cannot predict the future... But this does not mean that inferences drawn from history about the future are worthless, or that they do not serve...both as a guide to action and a key to our understanding of how things happen."⁶ Without understanding the past, we cannot understand the present.

References

- 1 Hobsbawm, Eric. 1998. "Identity History Is Not Enough". In: *On History*. London, Abacus. pp. 351-366.
- 2 Tazbir, Janusz. 1983. *Poland as the Rampart of Christian Europe: Myths and Historical Reality*. Warsaw, Interpress Publishers. The quotations below are from this book.

- 3 For an overview and bibliography, see: Sándor Csernus, "La Hongrie, le rempart de la chrétienté, naissance et épanouissement de l'idée d'une mission collective", in Chantal Delsol, Michel Maslowski, Joanna Nowicki, eds., *Mythes et symboles politiques en Europe Centrale* (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2002), pp. 107-124.
- 4 Linehan, Peter. 1993. *History and the Historians of Mediaeval Spain*. Oxford, Clarendon Press. E. Mitre Fernandez et al. 1997. *Fronteras y Fronterizos en la Historia*. Valladolid: Instituto de Historia Simancas. Universidad de Valladolid.
- 5 The second half of this paper is an abbreviated version of my article "La défense de la Chrétienté, les frontières et l'identité au Moyen Age" (forthcoming).
- 6 Carr, E.H. 1964. *What is History?* Harmondsworth, Penguin Books. pp. 68-69.



Lifelong Learning as a Potential of European Development: Two Analytical Perspectives on a 'Silent Revolution'

By PETER ALHEIT

Professor Peter Alheit is Director of the Institute for Applied Biographical and Lifeworld Research at the University of Bremen. He is also Chair of General Education, Dept. of Education, Georg-August-University, Göttingen. Recent publications include: *Social Capital, Education and Wider Benefits of Learning*, as well as *New Perspectives of 'Education' in Modernised Modern Societies* International Yearbook of Adult Education, vol. 28/29, pp. 97-120; edited with Johannes Beck, Eva Kammler, Henning Salling Olesen and Richard Taylor, *Lifelong Learning Inside and Outside Schools*, 2 vols, Roskilde: Roskilde University, Universität Bremen & University of Leeds.

Introduction

In the educational debate of the past 30 years—and especially during the most recent decade—the concept of lifelong learning has been sharpened in strategic and functional terms. In a certain sense, it stands for a new way of specifying the educational tasks in the societies of late Modernity. In its recent and highly influential document on educational policy, the *Memorandum on Lifelong Learning* (2000), the European Commission stated that "Lifelong learning is no longer just one aspect of education and training; it must become the guiding principle for provision and participation across the full continuum of learning contexts." (Commis-

sion of the European Communities, 2000, p. 3) Two decisive reasons are given for this assessment:

1. "Europe has moved towards a knowledge-based society and economy. More than ever before, access to up-to-date information and knowledge, together with the motivation and skills to use these resources intelligently on behalf of oneself and the community as a whole, are becoming the key to strengthening Europe's competitiveness and improving the employability and adaptability of the workforce;
2. Today's Europeans live in a complex social and political world. More than ever before, individuals want to plan their own lives, are expected to contribute actively to society, and must learn to live positively with cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity. Education, in its broadest sense, is the key to learning and understanding how to meet these challenges." (Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 5)

This double rationale has narrowed the scope of the concept in a functionalistic manner, on the one hand, but on the other hand it also adds precision to its definition. The *Memorandum* explicitly states that lifelong learning relates to all meaningful learning activities:

- to the *formal* learning processes that take place in the classical education and training institutions and which usually lead to recognized diplomas and qualifications;
- to the *non-formal* learning processes that usually take place alongside the mainstream systems of education and training—at the workplace, in clubs and associations, in civil society initiatives and activities, in the pursuit of sports or musical interests, and
- to *informal* learning processes that are not necessarily intentional and are a natural accompaniment to everyday life (Commission, 2000, p. 8).

The purpose behind this new understanding of the term 'learn-

ing' is the option of networking these different forms of learning in a synergistic way—learning should not only be systematically extended to cover the entire *lifespan*, but should also take place 'lifewide', i.e. learning environments should be engendered in which the various types of learning can complement each other organically. "The 'lifewide' dimension brings the complementarity of formal, non-formal and informal learning into sharper focus." (Commission, 2000, p. 9)

Lifelong, 'networked' learning thus seems to become an economic and social imperative of the first degree. The 'new concept' of lifelong learning betrays an ambition that John Field has termed 'the new educational order' (Field, 2000, p. 133 ff). Learning acquires a new meaning—for society as a whole, for education and training institutions, and for individuals. The shift in connotations exposes an inner contradiction, however, in that this new learning is initially 'framed' by political and economic precepts. The goals are competitiveness, employment and adaptive competence on the part of the 'workforce'. The intention is also, however, to strengthen freedom of biographical planning and the social involvement of individuals. Lifelong learning 'instrumentalizes' and 'emancipates' at one and the same time, quite obviously.

The following analysis will focus on the curious tensions between these two perspectives. Part 1 looks at the social framework for lifelong learning—'Perspective I'. Part 2 will put forward a particular theoretical view on 'education in the lifespan', namely the concept of *biographical learning*—a 'Perspective II'. A final chapter concentrates the findings in terms of relevant research questions that will strengthen European development of the humanities.

1. Perspective I—'lifelong learning' as reorganization of the education system

To begin with, however, we must explain the astonishing fact that, at the end of the 20th century, a global political consensus was generated on the concept of lifelong learning (Field, 2000, p. 3

ff). The factors triggering this astonishing paradigm shift on an international scale in education and training programmes are four trends in the post-industrial societies of the western hemisphere, trends which mutually overlap and which—in the words of John Field (2000, p. 35 ff)—led to a ‘silent explosion’ at the close of the 20th century: (a) the changing meaning of ‘work’, (b) the new and totally transformed function of ‘knowledge’, (c) the experience of increasing dysfunctionality on the part of mainstream education and training institutions, and (d) challenges facing the social actors themselves, which are only roughly characterized by labels such as ‘individualization’ and ‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1991; Beck & Giddens & Lash, 1996).

The changing nature of ‘work’ in the societies of late Modernity

The 20th century has drastically modified the meaning and significance of employment. Most people spend much less of their lifetime in work than their great-grandparents ever did. As recently as 1906, an average working year comprised approx. 2,900 hours; in 1946 the figure had fallen to 2,440 and in 1988 to a mere 1,800 hours (see Hall, 1999, p. 427). Changes have also occurred to the ‘inner structure’ of work. The large-scale shift of jobs from the industrial to the services sector is merely a superficial symptom of the changes taking place. The more crucial aspect is that the notion of a consistent ‘working life’ is finally a thing of the past, even granting that women were traditionally excluded anyway. Average employment no longer means practising one and the same occupation over a substantial span of one’s life, but now involves alternating phases of work and further training, voluntary and involuntary discontinuities of occupation, innovative career-switching strategies, and even self-chosen alternation between employment and family-centred phases (Arthur & Inkson & Pringle, 1999).

This trend has not only stimulated people’s expectations regarding the classical life course regime (Kohli, 1985) and made in-

dividual life planning a much riskier enterprise (Heinz, 2000b) but also poses new problems for the institutions involved, in their capacity as 'structuring agents of the life course' (Heinz 2000a, p. 5)—namely the agencies of the employment system and the labour market, the social and pension insurance institutions, but above all the institutions of the education system. It is they who must compensate for the consequences of deregulation and flexibilization in the labour market, to provide support for unanticipated and risk-laden status passages and transitions to 'modernized' life courses, and strike a new balance between the options held by individual actors on the one hand and the functional imperatives of the institutional 'meso-level' (Heinz, 2000a). As an innovative instrument for managing essential 'life politics', 'lifelong learning' is the obvious answer.

The new function of 'knowledge'

This idea of managing life politics seems all the more necessary, the more diffuse its subject-matter starts to become. The trivial, overriding consensus that, in the wake of the technological innovations engendered by the post-industrial 'information society', *knowledge* has become the key resource of the future, conceals the perplexity of the actual function and character of this 'knowledge' (Rahmstorf, 1999). The core issue, quite obviously, is not simply to disseminate and distribute a definable stock of knowledge as efficiently as possible, nor is it the fact that all walks of life are being subjected to increasing scientification (Wingens, 1998; Stehr, 2000), but rather a phenomenon that expands successively by virtue of the specific uses to which it is put, and which devalues itself again to a certain degree. 'Knowledge' is no longer that 'cultural capital' that, according to Bourdieu, determines social structures and guarantees its astonishing persistence through constantly recurring reproduction (Bourdieu, 1987). 'Knowledge' is a kind of 'grey capital' (Field, 2000, p. 1) that generates new, virtual economies. The stock market crash of the *New Economy* in 2000 is merely one dark side of the almost intangible quality of 'new knowledge'.

The communication and interaction networks of the IT age, which has long since permeated, extended and modified the realms of conventional industrial production and the character of classical services and administrations, remain dependent—more so than traditional forms of knowledge in the past—on the individual user. The latter's personal options in respect of the new, virtual markets, his contacts, productive inputs and consumer habits on the Internet are what create future forms of knowledge. The 'knowledge' of the information society is *doing knowledge*, a kind of 'lifestyle' that determines the structures of society far beyond the purely occupational domain and lends them a dynamic of ever-shorter cycles.

This very quality of 'new knowledge' now necessitates flexible feedback procedures, complex self-management checks and permanent quality management (Rahmstorf, 1999). In the process, the nature of 'education' and 'learning' is dramatically changed (Nolda, 1996). They no longer entail the communication and dissemination of fixed bodies of knowledge, values or skills, but rather a kind of 'knowledge osmosis' for ensuring what must now be a permanent and continuous exchange between individual knowledge production and organized knowledge management. The idea of 'lifelong learning', and especially 'self-managed learning', seems highly predestined for this process—as a framework concept at least.

The dysfunctionality of the established educational institutions

The conditions thus generated by a 'knowledge society' in the making render classical teaching-learning settings problematic, and above all the idea that accompanied the 'first career' of the lifelong learning label in the early 1970s—the *human capital theory*. The latter concept 'measures', as it were, the capital invested in education and training according to the length of full-time schooling, and assumes that extending its duration will have positive impacts on willingness to engage in lifelong learning (for a

critique, see Schuller, 1998; Field, 2000, p. 135). A number of recent empirical studies, particularly in Great Britain (e.g. Tavistock Institute, 1999; Merrill, 1999; Schuller & Field, 1999), provide evidence that the very opposite is the case—simply extending primary ‘schooling’, without drastic changes to the conditional framework and the quality of the learning process, led in the majority of those affected to a loss of motivation and to an instrumental attitude to learning that is in no way conducive to continued, self-managed learning in later phases of life but tends rather to suppress such learning (Schuller & Field, 1999).

Lifelong learning as it is now conceived requires a kind of *paradigm shift* in the organization of learning—not in adulthood, but in the very first forms of schooling. The goals for orientation are no longer efficiency of learning, effective didactic strategies and consistency of formal curricula, but rather the situation and the prerequisites on the part of *learners* (Bentley, 1998). This also means addressing non-formal and informal options for learning. The key educational question is no longer how certain material can be taught as successfully as possible, but which learning environments can best stimulate self-determined learning; in other words, how learning itself can be ‘learned’ (Simons, 1992; Smith, 1992).

Of course, this perspective must also include the conveying of basic qualifications such as reading, writing, arithmetic or computer literacy, but even these *basic skills* must be linked to practical experience; the owners of cognitively acquired skills must be able to combine these with social and emotional competencies (see Giddens, 1998, p. 125). Enabling such options demands a high degree of institutional ‘self-reflexivity’ on the part of education and training institutions in their classical form. They must accept that they, too, must become ‘learning organizations’. The necessity of preparing their clientele for lifelong, self-determined learning implies a concept of lifewide learning, or ‘holistic learning’.

Schools must network with the community to which they relate, with companies, associations, churches and organizations

active in that district, and with the families of schoolchildren in their care. They have to discover new locations for learning and invent other learning environments. Recent school development concepts, particularly those in which the separate institutions are granted substantial autonomy, are certainly providing greater scope. What is valid for schools is equally valid, of course, for universities, adult education facilities and public administration academies. As John Field correctly points out, lifelong learning necessitates a *'new educational order'* (Field, 2000, p. 133 ff)—a *'silent revolution'* in education.

'Individualization' and 'reflexive modernization'

This demand is neither absurd nor utopian when one looks at the situation facing a growing group of society's members. The demands levelled at individuals in the second half of the 20th century have changed considerably. Economic considerations are by no means the only factors responsible—social and cultural changes also play a critical role. Despite the continuation of social inequalities, the bonds to social milieus and classical mentalities have become looser (Beck, 1983, 1986; Vester et al., 1993; Alheit, 1994). Patterns of orientation have become more *'localized'* and tend to relate more now to generational or gender-based experience, to the perception of one's own ethnicity or even to preferences for certain lifestyles (Alheit, 1999). Inflationary changes in the range of information and consumer products on offer have dramatically increased the number of options open to members of society (Beck, 1986; Giddens, 1991). Life courses are therefore much less predictable than in the past. What is more, to an increasingly clear extent, the compulsion to make decisions on a continual basis and perform incessant changes of orientation is being devolved to individuals themselves.

This visible trend towards *'individualization'* of the life course regime and the concomitant pressure to engage in continuous *'reflexivity'* on one's own actions has led—as expressed in the prominent theses of Ulrich Beck or Anthony Giddens—to a differ-

ent, 'reflexive Modernity' (Beck & Giddens & Lash, 1996). Yet to be able to handle this different Modernity (Beck, 1986), individuals need completely new and flexible structures of competence that can only be established and developed within lifelong learning processes (see Field, 2000, p. 58 ff). And that calls for fundamental changes in the entire educational system.

Contours of a new 'educational economy'?

The astonishing consensus that appears to prevail on these doubtlessly plausible and complementary analyses of the age we live in extends from representatives of the traditional business community, through protagonists of the New Economy, to education experts in the modernized left-wing parties. What makes that consensus problematic is its indifference to the social consequences that would be unleashed if such educational policies were implemented without a measure of distance. The delusion of a *lifelong learning society* does nothing whatsoever to eradicate the selection and exclusion mechanisms of the 'old' educational system. Indeed, it may conceal and exacerbate those mechanisms instead (see Field, 2000, p. 103 ff).

It can already be shown with present empirical evidence that labour market segments requiring low skill levels are in chronic decline (OECD, 1997a). In other words, the expectations of the 'knowledge society' are raising the pressure on individuals to meet certain standards of skilling and knowledge before they can be employed. The risks of exclusion for those who fail to meet those standards are more draconian than was ever the case in by-gone industrial societies. Of course, the *logic* of exclusion is by no means new—'class' and 'gender' remain the decisive indicators (Field, 2000, p. 115 ff). As would be expected, *age* plays an increasingly significant role (Tuckett & Sargent, 1999). Anyone who never had the chance to learn how to learn will not make any effort to acquire new skills late in the life course.

The crude mechanisms of economic valuation prompt a sceptical view of any future scenario for the 'learning society'—a small

majority of 'winners', but with a 'life sentence' to learn, may close its borders to a growing minority of 'losers' who never had a chance, or who voluntarily liberated themselves from the strait-jacket of having to perpetually acquire and market new knowledge. The OECD forecast, in any case, comes close enough to the scenario just painted: "For those who have successful experience of education, and who see themselves as capable learners, continuing learning is an enriching experience, which increases their sense of control over their own lives and their society. For those who are excluded from this process, however, or who choose not to participate, the generalisation of lifelong learning may only have the effect of increasing their isolation from the world of the 'knowledge-rich'. The consequences are economic, in under-used human capacity and increased welfare expenditure, and social, in terms of alienation and decaying social infrastructure." (OECD, 1997b, p. 1) Alternatives are therefore needed.

A reasonable consequence would be to realize that lifelong learning cannot be reduced to investment in short-lived, exploitable economic capital, but that it must also be an investment—of equal value—in 'social capital', in the way we treat those next to us, the family, the neighbour, the coworker, the other club members, the people we meet in citizens' action groups or at the bar (see Field, 2000, p. 145 ff). In this sphere of life we are all lifelong learners. Nobody is excluded from the outset. Everybody is an expert. Shrinkage of this type of capital, declining 'confidence', the moratorium on 'solidarity' that Robert D. Putnam identified years ago in US society (Putnam, 2001), is also economically counter-productive in the medium term. A balance between these two intractable types of 'capital', on the other hand, could lead to a new kind of 'educational economy' or, more correctly perhaps, to a *social ecology of learning* in modern, modernized societies (for detailed treatment see Alheit & Kreitz, 2000). However, the precondition for such balance is that learning individuals be taken more seriously—which would also involve a *shift in analytic perspective*.

2. Perspective II: Aspects of a phenomenology of lifelong learning

So far we have talked about societal changes affecting the modern biography from a specific perspective, namely the *structural perspective*. And for good reason, since our lives are embedded in structures and cannot be extracted arbitrarily. Nevertheless, it would be theoretical foolishness to describe life and learning from this one perspective alone. If we view the problems that we typically encounter from the perspective of the subject, then 'structure' takes on an extraordinarily plastic character.

The 'hidden capacity' to lead our own lives

As biographical subjects we do indeed have the feeling of being the 'organizers' of our life course. Even when things fail to go the way we hoped or expected they would, we perform corrections to our life plans under the impression that we do so with personal autonomy. In other words, the conscious disposition towards our biography can be understood as an intentional action scheme (Schütze, 1981). The dominant attitude that we have to our own biography is one of planning. We are referring here to more than the 'big plans' that we cultivate for our lives—the dream job, the political career, housebuilding, finding a 'good match'—but also our plans for the weekend, the following afternoon or the programmes we want to watch on TV. We decide, for example, to lose 10 pounds in weight or to give up smoking, and even succeed in doing so. All of this conveys to us the impression that we hold our lives in our own hands and that we are the subjects of our biography. But this impression could be exceptionally problematic, and not only because fate could deal us a blow at any time, making us irrecoverably ill or jobless, or making us lose a loved one or all that we possess: The point is rather that our supposed autonomy of action and autonomous planning is subordinated to 'processual structures' in our biography (see Schütze, 1981, p. 69 ff) that we can influence only to a very marginal extent.

What is important is the finding that our basic feeling—that

we can act relatively independently vis-à-vis our own biographies—does not necessarily conflict with the fact that the greater part of our biographical activities are either fixed to a large degree or require various ‘supporters’ to initiate them. It appears plausible, therefore, that the ‘feeling’ is not actually an intentional action scheme at all, or a consciously desired biographical plan, but instead is a kind of hidden ‘meaning’ behind the alternating processual structures of our life course: the no doubt ubiquitous, albeit not always strategically available intuition that for all the contradiction, we are still dealing with ‘our’ lives (see Bude, 1984, p.7 ff). We entertain this unique ‘background idea’ of ourselves not in spite of, but precisely because of the structural limitations imposed by our social and ethnic origins, our gender and the era in which we are living (see Stanley, 1993, pp. 47 ff). Structure and subjectivity form an important combination here, the dissolution of which can lead to crisis. Such crises obviously affect more than ourselves and our capacities. They also depend on structures. ‘Life constructions’ (Bude, 1985) are generated between the twin poles of structure and subjectivity, and constructions only contain elements of reality if they also have a retroactive effect on underlying structures. This leads me to the final and most important idea relating to the consequences that the idea of biographical learning has for educational theory in the wider sense.

Learning processes within transition

Life constructions extend beyond what we narrate about our lives. They are hidden references to the structural conditions that are imposed on us. Bourdieu has provided convincing evidence of this fact, using his concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1987). But there is another side to life constructions: in the course of our lives we produce more ‘meaning’ relating to ourselves and our social framework than we can actually have ‘from the perspective of our reflexive biographical concern with self’ (Bude, 1985, p. 85). We command biographical background knowledge with which we are able to fill out and make full use of the social space in which

we move. None of us has all conceivable possibilities open to him or her. But within the framework of a restricted modification potential, we have more opportunities than we will ever put into practice. Our biography therefore contains a sizeable potential of 'unlived life' (von Weizsäcker, 1956). Intuitive knowledge about it is part of our 'practical consciousness' (Giddens, 1988). It is not accessible on a simple reflexive basis, but in a dual sense it represents a very unusual resource for educational processes:

- Our prescriptive knowledge about life constructions which accompany us but which we have not implemented, or at least not yet, keeps the reflexively available reference to self fundamentally open and creates the preconditions for us to take a different attitude towards ourselves without having to 'revise' this 'hidden' meaning. The processual structures of our life course, the dynamics of their emergence at the surface, suggest an extension or restriction of autonomous biographical action. Conscious 'ratification' of them is our own responsibility as the subject of our own biography. We are, in a certain sense, 'autopoietic systems' (Nassehi & Weber, 1990), to use an irritating yet stimulating concept from Luhmann's systems theory. We have the scope to identify the surplus meanings in our experience of life and to appropriate them for a conscious change in our self- and world-referentiality.
- At the same time, however, biographical background knowledge is an emergent potential for changing structures. The modification of individual self- and world-referents—even in the limited context of specific life constructions—contains opportunities to transform the institutional framework conditions of social existence. Substantial elements of these 'structures' are the unquestioned certainties functioning in the background to which social individuals relate intuitively when acting on an everyday plane, but also when acting biographically. As soon as such prescripts—or only parts of them—enter

our awareness and become available, structures begin to change. Unlived life does indeed possess socially explosive force.

The dynamics of this 'double educational resource' evokes associations with the enlightening option in classical psychoanalysis: '*where Id was, Ego shall be*'. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that the important issue is not only the self-assured, strong Ego dealing with a basic dynamic that is otherwise unchangeable, but is the transition to a new quality of self- and world-referentiality—a process that leaves neither the learning subject nor the surrounding structural context unchanged. In other words, we are dealing here with learning processes within transitions (Alheit, 1993). Transitional learning processes are in a certain sense 'abductive'. They implement what is described in early American pragmatism, particularly by Charles Sanders Peirce, as the ability to network something that "we would never previously have dreamed could be combined" (Pierce, 1991 [1903], p. 181).

This ability requires, of course, a social actor. Knowledge can only be genuinely transitional if it is biographical knowledge. Solely when specific individuals relate to their life-world in such a way that their self-reflexive activities begin to shape social contexts, is contact established with that key qualification of modern times, what I have elsewhere termed 'biographicity' (Alheit, 1992). Biographicity means that we can redesign again and again, from scratch, the contours of our life within the specific contexts in which we (have to) spend it, and that we experience these contexts as 'shapeable' and designable. In our biographies, we do not possess all conceivable opportunities, but within the framework of the limits we are structurally set we still have considerable scope open to us. The main issue is to decipher the 'surplus meanings' of our biographical knowledge, and that in turn means perceiving the potentiality of our unlived lives.

However, reflexive learning processes do not take place exclu-

sively 'inside' the individual, but depend on communication and interaction with others and relations to a social context. Biographical learning is embedded in life-worlds that can be analysed under certain conditions as 'learning environments' or 'learning milieus'(see Lave & Wenger, 1991). Learning within and through one's life history is therefore interactive and socially structured, on the one hand, but it also follows its own 'individual logic' that is generated by the specific, biographically layered structure of experience. The biographical structure does not determine the learning process, because it is an open structure that has to integrate the new experience it gains through interacting with the world, with others and with itself. On the other hand, however, it significantly affects the way in which new experience is formed and 'built into' a biographical learning process (Alheit & Dausien, 2000a).

3. New research questions on a European lifelong learning agenda

It seems, indeed, that any serious, analytical involvement with the complex phenomenon of 'lifelong learning' will be contingent on a *paradigm shift* among educationalists:

- at the social *macro*-level, in respect of a new policy for education and training that aims at striking a different balance between economic, cultural and social capital (Alheit & Kreitz, 2000);
- at the institutional *meso*-level, also in respect of a new 'self-reflexivity' of organizations that should conceive of themselves as 'environments' and 'agencies' of complex learning and knowledge resources, and no longer as the administrators and conveyors of codified, dominant knowledge (Field, 2000);
- at the individual *micro*-level, with regard to the increasingly complicated linkages and processing accomplished by the specific actors in the face of the social and media-related challenges of late Modernity, which call for a new quality in the in-

dividual and collective construction of meanings (Alheit, 1999). We still know too little, in fact, about the systemic balances between economic and social capital. We hardly know anything yet about that 'grey capital' of new knowledge (Field, 2000, p. 1) and its impacts on long-term learning processes. Of course, comparing different types of post-industrial society—e.g. the distinct differences between Danish or British or German strategies for arriving at a 'learning society'—makes it worthwhile carrying out systematic international comparisons of educational economics.

Yet we have only scraps of information about the institutional prerequisites for the paradigm shift required—"What pressures to change are operating on educational and training institutions? [...] What concepts and measures are applied and accepted as best practice in the fields of quality management, organizational development and personnel development?—What theoretical and empirical conditions justify speaking of educational establishments as 'learning organizations'?" (Forschungsmemorandum, 2000, p. 13).

We are discovering more and more new, more complex and riskier status passages and transitions in modern life courses (Heinz, 2000b). We observe astonishing and creative (re-)constructions in individual biographies (Alheit, 1994; Dausien, 1996). However, we are still missing a systematically elaborated theory of *biographical and situated learning*—"In which learning cultures and dependencies of supra-individual patterns, mentalities and milieus does individual learning develop? What implicit learning potentials and learning processes are shown in social milieus and groups (e.g. within families and between generations)?" (Forschungsmemorandum, 2000, p. 5).

These open research questions are raised by the 'new' concept of lifelong learning. They include the idea that social learning is obviously—more than ever before in history—an achievement of the subjects concerned. The 'biographicity' of learning affects institutional and even societal macro-structures. Jacques Delors, in

his famous UNESCO Report of 1996, called it 'the treasure within'. We may add: it should be understood as an important 'social' and 'cultural capital' for the future development of Europe.

References

Alheit, P. (1992): The Biographical Approach to Adult Education. In: Wilhelm Mader (Ed.), *Adult Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: Scholarly Approaches and Professional Practice*. – Vancouver, pp. 186-222.

Alheit, P. (1993): Transitorische Bildungsprozesse: Das 'biographische Paradigma' in der Weiterbildung. In: Mader, W. (Ed.) (1993): *Weiterbildung und Gesellschaft. Grundlagen wissenschaftlicher und beruflicher Praxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. – Bremen, 2nd, extended print run, pp. 343-418.

Alheit, P. (1994): *Zivile Kultur. Verlust und Wiederaneignung der Moderne*. – Frankfurt a.M., New York.

Alheit, P. (1999): On a contradictory way to the 'Learning Society': A critical approach. In: *Studies in the Education of Adults* 31 (1), pp. 66-82.

Alheit, P. / Dausien, B. (2000): 'Biographicity' as a basic resource of lifelong learning. In: *Alheit, P. / Beck, J. / Kammler, E. / Salling Olesen, H. / Taylor, R.* (Eds.), *Lifelong Learning Inside and Outside Schools, Vol. 2*. – Roskilde, pp. 400-422.

Alheit, P. / Kreitz, R. (2000): 'Social Capital', 'Education' and the 'Wider Benefits of Learning'. Review of 'models' and qualitative research outcomes. Gutachten für das *Centre of Education* der University of London und das *Department for Education and Employment* der englischen Regierung, Göttingen / London (unpublished manuscript).

Arthur, M.B. / Inkson, K. / Pringle, J.K. (1999): *The New Careers: Individual action and economic change*. – London.

Beck, U. (1986): *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. – Frankfurt a.M.

Beck, U. / Giddens, A. / Lash, S. (1996): *Reflexive Modernisierung. Eine Kontroverse*. – Frankfurt a.M.

Bentley, T. (1998): *Learning Beyond the Classroom: Education for a changing world*. – London.

Bourdieu, P. (1987): *Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen*

Urteilkraft. – Frankfurt a.M.

Bude, H. (1984): Die Rekonstruktion von Lebenskonstruktionen. Eine Antwort auf die Frage, was Biographieforschung bringt. In: Martin Kohli und Günther Robert (Eds.), *Biographie und soziale Wirklichkeit. Neue Beiträge und Forschungsperspektiven.* – Stuttgart, pp. 7-28.

Bude, H. (1985): Die individuelle Allgemeinheit des Falls. In: Hans-Werner Franz (Ed.), *22. Deutscher Soziologentag 1984. Beiträge der Sektions- und Ad-hoc-Gruppen.* – Opladen, pp. 82-84.

Commission of the European Communities (2000): *A Memorandum on Lifelong Learning.* – Lisbon.

Dausien, B. (1996): *Biographie und Geschlecht. Zur biographischen Konstruktion sozialer Wirklichkeit in Frauenlebensgeschichten.* – Bremen.

Delors, J. (1996): *Learning: The Treasure Within. Report to UNESCO of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century.* – Paris.

Field, J. (2000): *Lifelong Learning and the New Educational Order.* – Stoke on Trent, UK.

Forschungsmemorandum für die Erwachsenen- und Weiterbildung (2000): Im Auftrag der Sektion Erwachsenenbildung der DGfE verfasst von R. Arnold, P. Faulstich, W. Mader, E. Nuissl von Rein, E. Schlutz. – Frankfurt a.M. (Internet source).

Giddens, A. (1988): *Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft.* – Frankfurt am Main/New York

Giddens, A. (1991): *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age.* – Cambridge.

Hall, P. (1999): Social Capital in Britain. In: *British Journal of Political Science*, 29 (3), pp. 417-461.

Heinz, W. (2000a): Editorial: Strukturbezogene Biographie- und Lebenslauf-forschung. der Sfb 186 'Statuspassagen und Risikolagen im Lebensverlauf'. In: Heinz, W. (Hrsg) (2000): *Übergänge. Individualisierung, Flexibilisierung und Institutionalisation des Lebenslaufs.* 3. Beiheft 2000 der ZSE. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und Sozialisation.* – Weinheim, pp. 4-8.

Heinz, W. (Ed.) (2000b): *Übergänge. Individualisierung, Flexibilisierung und Institutionalisation des Lebenslaufs.* 3. Beiheft 2000 der ZSE. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und Sozialisation.* – Weinheim.

Kohli, M. (1985): *Die Institutionalisation des Lebenslaufs. Historische Befunde*

- und theoretische Argumente. In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 37, pp. 1-29.
- Merrill, B.* (1999): Gender, Change and Identity. Mature Women Students in Universities. – Aldershot.
- Nassehi, A. & G. Weber* (1990): Zu einer Theorie biographischer Identität. Epistemologische und systemtheoretische Argumente. In: Bios, 4, pp. 153-187.
- Nolda, S.* (Ed.) (1996): Erwachsenenbildung in der Wissensgesellschaft. – Bad Heilbrunn.
- OECD* (1997a): Literacy Skills for the Knowledge Society. Further results of the international adult literacy survey. – Paris.
- OECD* (1997b): What Works in Innovation in Education. Combatting exclusion through adult learning. – Paris.
- Putnam, R.D.* (2001): Gesellschaft und Gemeinsinn. Sozialkapital im internationalen Vergleich. – Gütersloh.
- Rahmstorf, G.* (1999): Wissensgesellschaft. Nachricht Nr. 00079 im Archiv der Mailingliste wiss-org (Internet source).
- Schuller, T.* (1998): Human and Social Capital: Variations within a Learning Society. In: Alheit, P. / Kammler, E. (Eds.) (1998): Lifelong Learning and its Impact on Social and Regional Development. – Bremen, pp. 113-136.
- Schuller, T. / Field, J.* (1999): Is there divergence between initial and continuing education in Scotland and Northern Ireland? In: Scottish Journal of Adult Continuing Education, 5 (2), pp. 61-76.
- Simons, P.R.J.* (1992): Theories and principles of learning to learn. In: Tuijnman, A. / van der Kamp, M. (Eds.) (1992): Learning Across the Lifespan. Theories, Research, Policies. – Oxford, pp. 173-188.
- Smith, R.M.* (1992): Implementing the learning to learn concept. In: Tuijnman, A. / van der Kamp, M. (Eds.) (1992): Learning Across the Lifespan. Theories, Research, Policies. – Oxford, pp. 173-188.
- Stehr, N.* (2000): Erwerbsarbeit in der Wissensgesellschaft oder Informationstechnologien, Wissen und der Arbeitsmarkt. Vancouver (Internet source).
- Tavistock Institute* (1999): A Review of Thirty New Deal Partnerships. Research and Development Report ESR 32, Employment Service. – Sheffield.
- Tuckett, A. / Sargant, N.* (1999): Making Time. The NIACE survey on adult participation in learning 1999. – Leicester.
- Vester, M. et al.* (1993): Soziale Milieus im gesellschaftlichen Strukturwandel.

zwischen Integration und Ausgrenzung. – Cologne.

Weizsäcker, V. von (1956): Pathosophie. – Göttingen.

Wingens, M. (1998): Wissensgesellschaft und Industrialisierung der Wissenschaft. – Wiesbaden.

Culture, Media and Globalization

Humanities and the European Project.

By IB BONDEBJERG

Ib Bondebjerg is a professor at the Department of Film and Media Studies, University of Copenhagen. He is also Director of the Centre for Media and Democracy in the Network Society (2002-2005) and, together with Peter Golding (UK), co-director of the European Media Research Project *Changing Media—Changing Europe* (2000-2005). His edited and co-edited English books are: *Television in Scandinavia. History, Aesthetics and Politics* (University of Luton Press, 1996), *Intertextuality and Visual Media* (Seksens 99, University of Copenhagen, 1999), *Moving Images, Culture and the Mind* (University of Luton Press, 2000), *The Danish Directors: Dialogues on a Contemporary National Cinema* (Intellect Books, 2001) and *Media Cultures in a Changing Europe* (Intellect Books, 2002, forthcoming).

Seen in a very long historical perspective, European culture is an ancient phenomenon and in both a historical and modern perspective there is no doubt that global culture is strongly influenced and framed by European values, products, traditions, sciences and art. From ancient Greek civilization and the Roman Empire, through the Enlightenment and the colonization of Africa and discovery of America, European culture, for better and worse, has influenced our global culture. As a very global superpower, we may tend to forget this not very remote pre-history of Europe when discussing the processes of globalization in the present modern era of the Information Society. For many years, since the

Second World War at least, the discussion has tended to focus on American globalization and Europe in a defensive role.

The rise of modern communication technologies and the media has indeed shaped and transformed the traditional processes of globalization, and in this process Europe has been seriously weakened by its lack of integration and ability to use its potential cultural and social riches and power. America as a younger and more unified market and culture has been much more efficient in its use of new media and technologies. However, it would be a serious mistake to see the conflict between the US and the EU as the most important conflict in the era of a global media culture. Even though US products have dominated European media culture, especially in the area of film and television fiction, the conflict in the globalization process is just as much a conflict between principles of democratic and cultural governance and market forces that are present in both America and Europe.

So the line between a European model and an American model must not be simplified, and it is important to recognize that inside Europe, too, there are very different media and culture models along a line from strong market dominance (Italy) to strong public dominance (Scandinavia). In Europe there is also a strong move towards market in the sense that mergers between big media companies are a powerful European phenomenon. In 2001 alone, European media groups were partners in 72% of all global mergers. This means that European cultural industries and media companies are already positioning themselves in the big business operations of globalization, certainly not as dominant partners, but not as sleeping partners either.

European culture is a historical fact and a strong part of both the historical and modern global culture, but European culture certainly is not a stable or homogenous phenomenon, and has been strongly influenced by other cultures both historically and in modern times. To search for one European culture is therefore to search for a phantom. European culture is at best a unity of diversities, a conglomerate of multicultural elements and many na-



tional, regional and local cultural variations. Policy-makers and the EU system may be right in seeing this as a very big problem and challenge for the continued project of European integration, but it should also be seen as a strength, as a richness. Orchestrated in the right way, this could be turned into a powerful offensive element of the future European integration project. And this is why the humanities are essential for European research.

Stories and images: the stuff cultural integration is made of

In his book *The Undeclared War. The Struggle for Control over the World's Film Industry*, David Putnam, a key figure behind the thoughts and ideas in the development of European media policy and media programmes, points to the key role of images and stories for the successful integration of nations and cultures:

"Stories and images are among the principal means by which the human society has always transmitted values and beliefs from generation to generation and community to community. Movies, along with all the other activities driven by stories and the images and characters that flow with them, are now at the very heart of the way we run our economies and live our lives." (Putnam, 1997: 357)

Humanities more than other sciences deal especially with culture, language, history and the world of stories and images in both fictional worlds and other forms of communication. Consequently, seen from a purely cultural point of view, humanities are among the core sciences if we are to understand why an integrated European culture is so difficult to reach.

But the cultural and scientific argument for the humanities as "essential research for Europe" is only one side of the argument if we are talking about media and culture. In terms of economics and technology, too, the media and culture sector is now the fastest and most important sector in the global information economy. In a recent joint publication from the Danish Ministry of Cul-

ture and the Danish Ministry of Trade and Commerce, *Danmarks kreative potentiale* ("Denmark's Creative Potential") the main point is precisely that culture today is central to the new economy of the information-based society and an integrated part of all sectors. In economic terms, this new cultural economy and media culture is the fastest-growing sector in the present economy. US exports of culture and entertainment grew from USD 95bn in 1980 to 387bn in 2000. And in a small European nation like Denmark the cultural sector represents more than DKK 75bn, exports of DKK 15bn and more than 14,000 companies with 60,000 employees (*Danmarks kreative potentiale*, 2000, p. 6).

Thus, cultural integration is not just important for the success of European integration in terms of everyday life, models of identification and media production, but culture, narratives and images are also *big business*. The general statistics of audiovisual companies show a general trend towards growth of private, commercial and non-European based companies. The American/Japanese companies become bigger, as last seen with the large merger between AOL and Time Warner, introducing the strong new relationship between Internet computer communication and film, TV and all other forms of entertainment and media. The sector now comprises both cable and telecom, Internet and multimedia, publishing, music, broadcast and cable, video/DVD and film, ranging from production to distribution, from hardware technologies to software and programme content.

As already indicated, European companies are involved in many of the new mergers among multinational companies. But if we look at the European sector, public service television and a film sector based on a mixture of public cultural support and market are losing power as cultural pillars of the audiovisual European space. It is very clear from the global top 50 that traditional large-size public service companies like ARD and BBC have lost the battle against commercial stations and companies such as Canal+ and RTL. And just one look at the statistics of the European Union's audiovisual markets alone shows that the commer-

cial sector far outnumbered public radio and TV revenues. Furthermore, the development remains largely unchanged so far, despite what is now more than 10 years of EU audiovisual policies; or it may even be the case, especially in the television sector, that EU policy has fuelled the public service television crisis.

But although the figures are pretty depressing and negative, it is too early to dismiss the importance of a strong and consistent EU policy in this area and as a supranational structure astride national policies. After all, culture in the broader sense did not enter Community policies before the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which opened the way for a broader policy and research agenda on culture. The theme of this conference is therefore very timely and appropriate: now is precisely the time when we can begin developing a broader cultural policy and research agenda for the benefit of a much deeper integration of Europe in future.

In the years to come, globalization and digitalization and the convergence between film, TV and computer will probably mean the end of broadcasting as we know it and the development of new forms of media convergence with elements of both broadcasting and more individualized and interactive media use. This digitalization and media convergence between different media sectors will put tough pressure on the European system, with its duality of public service and private commercial channels. But the development is not just a threat to the diversity of culture and a democratic communicative space. The new technologies, which are much easier to use and also much cheaper, potentially open up possibilities for decentralizing and democratizing media and culture. At one and the same time, globalization processes are creating strong centralization and potential for decentralization as well as easier public access and use. However, the European public service channels are no longer so strong and, again, looking at fiction production in particular, we have a very stable pattern of strong American dominance in general, strong national production, in terms of audience awareness and shares at least, but almost nonexistent European production or circulation of national products within Europe.

Underlying the problems for a European media culture, which we can read from the quantitative data and statistics on economy, markets etc., are the problems for European cinema and television as a means of cultural expression, as aesthetics or even as a representation of cultural identities. The problem with European cinema and also to a large extent European television is not just American dominance, but the fact that a European *mainstream* cinema is missing, and that European *art cinema* and *highbrow television* fiction are important but cannot do the job. This means that the plurality of European images is in danger. American mainstream cinema and TV substitute European mainstream cinema and TV. The lack of a European market for distribution and the lack of a more powerful mixture of public and private money have made European audiovisual culture too dependent on elitist taste.

This problem has already held centre stage in the concern about many European film and television cultures and EU audiovisual media policy. The problem, however, seems to be that it is very difficult to break the main tendency in the individual European nations, where national film and television fiction rate highly in audience popularity and American fiction scores equally well, whereas European film and television fiction score very low. There seems to be no transeuropean cultural identity that film and media fiction can build on. Policy instruments can try to compensate for this by creating new transeuropean structures and markets, but you cannot force a unity into a centuries-old culture like the European one, composed as it is of very different, historical, national cultures. European culture in the audiovisual sphere cannot be built on a top-down construction of a synthetic and homogenous European cultural identity.

If we look at some of the early results of EU audiovisual policy, many of the first European coproductions at the beginning of the nineties were too dominated by 'europudding', films constructed to meet a criterion of European identity set by the economic and political system. The negative experience gained from some of these films has now led to a more natural approach to cofunding:

European money put into films that may seem purely national by origin but actually turn out to work well in other European countries without being "European" in the more construed way. The richness of European culture—with its widespread national, regional and local differences—is not a problem, in fact, as long as the distribution and marketing barriers can be overcome.

Thanks to the statistical data of, say, the Audiovisual Observatory in Strasbourg and the work done by researchers on the so-called Eurofiction Research team, we are beginning to understand some of the basic structures in both European film and television culture. The figures and data documented here confirm the problems for European products globally and outside their own national market (see Buonanno, 2000). But we need a lot more in-depth analysis of these data and the cultural and social context they are embedded in; and, more especially, we need more qualitative research into the structures and mechanisms behind the area of the European imaginary. Basic research in fiction is therefore not just research in something remote from the strategic policy areas of the EU, it is research into the very core of mechanisms where European integration fails, and policies and money are wasted.

European Film and Media Culture: a national American culture

When Denmark won the European Football Championship in 1992, the incident—as an isolated media event, but also as a real physical manifestation—outstripped or at least equalled the national rejoicing and celebrations of the Liberation after the Second World War. Until recently, more than 2.1 million Danes were

1 *Rejseholdet* recently won the international Emmy Award in New York for best Drama Series. Written by Peter Thorsboe et al. and based on the Danish Flying Squad [*Rejseholdet*], the original series contained 30 episodes.

watching the Danish crime series *Rejseholdet* every Sunday evening—yet another example of a national ritual, this time completely TV-made, where the media symbolically construct a common national forum. The examples could have been taken from film as well: when popular Danish films are shown in the cinema or on television, they far outnumber American films in viewing figures. The audiovisual culture in a small European culture such as the Danish one is still very much about audiovisual products that represent and symbolically tie in with a national identity.

These two examples are not one-off incidents, they are part of a very stable pattern: European media culture is American and national, but not European when we talk about the world of fiction. If we look at the film sector and the historical development from 1960 to 1992 (see *Report by the Think Tank on Audiovisual Policy in the European Union*, 1994: 81 ff), that is the period before the EU embarked on a very hefty offensive to create a common European Media Market. The figures are very clear, whether we are talking about films or TV fiction: between 70 and 80% of all films shown in the individual European countries and 70-80% of all TV fiction shown on European TV is American. European films and European TV fiction are successful neither outside of their own national European market nor on the rest of the global market. But in many European countries, national film and TV fiction can be highly successful.

Developments since 1992 leave some room for optimism, especially about the national share of films, but also for European shares. The latest statistics available for the EU as a whole show an increase in both national films on their own markets and European films outside of their national markets in other European countries (see *European Audiovisual Observatory Statistical Yearbook*, 2001). For the most part, however, such positive developments can only be seen in some European nations, the pattern not being sufficiently stable to really change the general picture. In Denmark, for instance, the latest figures from 2001 indicate a rise in the national share of films to almost 30% of the market, with a

drop in the American share to 59%. However, the European share is still only about 9% (Bondebjerg, 2003, forthcoming). The general European data on films for 2001 further show a similar drop in American shares from the normal 70-80% to approx. 66%. However, this is mostly the result of a rise in national shares, so the same picture emerges: a strong, albeit weakened American dominance; a stronger national share, but a fairly stable and weak European share. Europeans simply don't seem to care for other European film and media products.

If we dig a little deeper into the general statistics on individual films, the picture becomes even clearer. Taking Denmark as an example, the latest cumulative figures for the success of individual films underline the general picture. In the top-fifty list of all films shown in Denmark between 1995 and 2001 we find only three films from the UK, none from the rest of Europe and 16 films from Denmark, all the rest being American—a very narrow "film-Europe" indeed, with none of the old, top-league European film nations (France, Germany, Italy) represented. But the strength of the national films is surprising: in the top 10 we find five Danish and five American films, and among the top Danish films (nos. 2 and 3) we find a 'dogma film' and another low-budget film. This indicates that big American budgets are not the only solution and are no guarantee of success. Small and national can be beautiful as long as the images and narratives are experienced as important images and narratives of cultural identity and belonging.

Another important factor, however, is that national films from Europe have actually succeeded more generally in penetrating the American market, a market that has so far been virtually closed to Europe—not by restrictions but by lack of proper distribution and marketing and strong cultural traditions among American audiences. In America, European film is foreign and considered an elitist art form. But if we look to the Scandinavian market alone, the trend seems now to have changed a little. Some of the dogma films (for instance, a low-budget film like the Danish *Italian for beginners*) have enjoyed quite big success both in Eur-

ope as a whole and on the US market. These figures are supported by general European trends. We are not talking big changes here, but there is some sign of progress nevertheless. European coproductions also seem to go down well, and single, national films are beginning to travel across borders more.

It is fair to ask the question of why it is so difficult for European films to survive on their own market in Europe and to penetrate the American market. The European Union is the largest market in the developed world—bigger than the US—it has more intellectual and technical resources, and it has a cultural diversity and heritage unequalled by its primary competitor, the US. How come, then, that American movies, American TV and the American lifestyle for the populations of the world and Europe at large have become the lingua franca of globalization, the closest we get to a visual world culture? One reason for this continued American dominance could be that American cinema culture simply makes better films than the Europeans, films that have a greater universal appeal because they are based on stories and narrative structures that have general, mainstream qualities. This, I think, is probably part of the story: American film production taken as a whole is enormous, and quantity in this case results in quality.

However, there are also important social and economic factors that explain the success of American cinema and the problems of European cinema. The Americans have a production culture geared to mass production, run basically by market forces and private economy, and they have an efficient national market and economy for films, as well as an equally efficient international market strategy. The budget for even a big European film is often less than the budget for marketing and distributing an American film. So because the European market is nonexistent, viewed as a production culture for film and television, films and TV programmes are made primarily for the country that produces them. Europeans have a fragmented film and TV culture compared to Americans. The past ten years have seen a slight change in this as a result of coproduction and cofunding at European level and be-

tween Europe and the US, and thanks to EU support for professional networks, cinemas and distribution. However, there is still a long way to go.

Europe and the democratic deficit: the lack of a European public sphere

Along with this cultural deficit in Europe, we could also talk about the European democratic deficit. I shall not have time here to analyse the other side of the European media culture, the production of news, factual programs and information in general, but two major points can be made. Firstly, news, be it in the form of TV news, radio news or newspapers, is still primarily tied to national media and the national space. Figures from the ESF programme *Changing Media—Changing Europe* concerning developments between 1960-2001 seem to indicate that, contrary to normal belief, international news has not grown in the media, despite growing globalization and a stronger need for a global outlook and global democracy. The mounting problems of general public support for the EU as a democratic and political project in the individual nation states cannot be blamed on the media, at least not alone, but they do indicate that as citizens Europeans are first and foremost local and national before they become European and even global.

The project of a European public sphere and the even greater problem of a larger global democracy seem to be a necessity, but a very difficult undertaking. Technology and new media, however global in nature and potential, cannot change reality alone. The few attempts to date to launch European newspapers or European TV channels (*The European*, *EuroNews*, *Eurosport* etc.) have had little success and general impact. Although these attempts and the new avenues opening up for pan-European Internet services may have potential for the future, it is important to note that technologies only work when supported by real social changes and structures that are important to people in their

everyday lives. So far, however, there is no real European, democratic public culture or structure in place for a European media culture to build on.

The second key point we can make is that globalization, especially the rise of commercial giants in Europe, may pose threats to the free press and the free flow of information so vital to the democratic development of Europe and the empowerment of European citizens. The danger of exclusion and censorship is great if commercial powers rule, and if politics and commercial media are merged, as we are seeing in Italy right now. The threat to critical voices and independent journalism may escalate if entertainment dominates information. In the area of journalism, news and factual programming, also, special European measures and policies need to be evolved. What we will see in the future is media convergence and merging of sectors in which, for instance, newspapers, TV, radio and online news and information will be the standard model. Given the power structure of global companies, this will call for initiatives on the part of the EU to sustain and protect freedom of the press and cultural diversity. Market forces alone will not suffice.

Most Europeans, it seems, both politically and culturally, are national (they are Germans, Greeks, Danes etc) before they are Europeans, not to speak of global citizens. We can see trends towards the globalization of all the world's markets, including the European market, where big transnational conglomerates are assuming power over communications and therefore challenging national media and communication policies. But on the level of everyday life and on many levels of cultural, national policy agendas, European culture and a European public sphere is more of a phantom than a reality.

Globalization and glocalization: global media cultures as a cultural melting pot

As the previous data and arguments show, we still live and think

very much as local and national citizens, not as the European and global citizens we are also slowly becoming. There is a growing gap between the A-team of globalization, the global elites of politics, finance and media, and the B-team of ordinary national citizens. In the years to come, virtual technological globalization and cultural and social globalization will continue in real time, demanding measures to overcome these potential information gaps and gaps between the global and the local. However, the process of globalization is very complex. Recent theories about globalization rather indicate that this process is an interactive melting pot, a system of globalizing, hegemonic tendencies and local adaptations, and influences rebounding on the global, a process called 'glocalization'. In a society characterized by electronic communication and transnational networks, globalization processes are being intensified and identity-building structures are changing. This creates a reflexivity and constant focus on identity in the media and in everyday life, reflexivity that can sustain a new cosmopolitan outlook but can also produce counter-reactions to globalization in the regional, the national and the quest for ethnic purity.

The development of a network society increases the possibility of forming new social and cultural platforms for collective and individual forms of communication and organization along lines other than national and traditional demographic patterns. Globalization, then, is not just equatable with *homogenization and commercialization*. Globalization and the encounter between the local, the national and the global is also a necessary and ongoing dynamic that leads to *hybridization, creolization* and a more peaceful coexistence and exchange between global forces and local and national cultural traditions. In this global, cultural melting pot, the media play an important role in shaping and negotiating this meeting of cultural trends. Cultural dominance and the control of cultural production, channels and media business in different sectors are still very much on the agenda and should cause concern. But to see globalization in a gloomy Huxley-Orwellian perspective, where everything will be turned into either superficial

entertainment or a "Big-Brother's-watching-you society", is certainly out of tune with what we now know about global processes of culture and communication.

Studying these cultural globalization processes is important for a European research community, but in order to develop a research agenda on these matters we need interdisciplinary, intra-EU cooperation between the humanities and the social sciences that can examine economic globalization, technology and quantitative data as well as more qualitative data. The complexities are there in real life and in living culture, but they do not always turn up in general statistics. That is why we need cooperation between qualitative and quantitative studies, and between humanities and social sciences in film and media studies. And that is why we need the EU to secure humanities research as part of the important agenda facing Europe in the light of globalization and media culture, and deeper European integration.

The need for a European cultural and social research agenda

Globalization has resulted in an intense mediatization of politics, culture and everyday life, and we are in the middle of the transformation from a more traditional society dominated by national institutions and mass communication to a society dominated by global networks and media converging into digital and more dynamic, interactive multimedia cultures. The problems I have raised so far for a European culture point to the need for a strong European cultural and social research agenda. The new FP6 programme already launched responds to this challenge with only very weak measures in the area of cultural studies and media, failing to support the European and national research potentials that already exist.

But research is already being done by, for instance, the European Science Foundation Programme *Changing Media—Changing Europe* (see below), which deals with many of the key problems for

the European media raised in this presentation. The programme started in 2000 and will finish by 1 January 2005. The programme engages 60 researchers from the humanities and social sciences from 16 European countries. The programme focuses on comparative European media studies involving both the analysis of existing national and European data, and the production of new quantitative and qualitative data. It is very striking that research of this kind, involving both the humanities and the social sciences, research that addresses important problems for a European media culture, has so far only been financed by the national research councils through ESF, not by the EU framework programmes. There is a genuine need for change here, change that will probably only come about if a proper European Research Council is started and strategic research at European level begins to focus more on general social and cultural problems of a long-term nature and less on short-term research with industrial potential. After all, culture is big business now, as already pointed out, though as such it should be *more than* studied if we want it to be of importance to the citizens of Europe.

Authors note

With Professor Peter Golding of the UK, Ib Bondebjerg is co-director of the ESF programme Changing Media—Changing Europe (2000-2004). (www.lboro.ac.uk/research/changing.media/). The programme will publish a series of books derived from the comparative research done on the four teams and emerging from more general work across the teams. Two general books have been planned: *European Media Culture in a Changing Europe* and *Keywords in European Media Studies*. In Team 1 (Citizenship and Consumerism: Media, the Public Sphere and the Market), the following books are planned: *European TV and the Press, 1960-2000. A Comparative study* (10 countries) and *Money Talks: The Commercialization of Public Discourse*. In Team 2 (Culture and Commerce: Media Between Cultural and Industrial Policy), the following books are planned: *Mediatization and Professionalization of Politics* and *Concentration and Diversity in European Television*. In Team 3 (Convergence and Fragmentation: Media Technology and

the Information Society), the following books are planned: *Fragile Europe: Media in Coherence and Convergence* and *Virtual Learning: Technology and the European Information Society*. And finally, in Team 4 (Homogenization and Diversity: Media and Cultural Identities), they plan to publish a book on *European Media, Audiences and Cultural Identities*. The final conference of the programme in Nice in December 2004 will present some of the results to a larger European audience and specially invited guests.

References

- Bondebjerg, Ib (2003, forthcoming). Filmen I den globale mediekultur. In: Klaus Bruhn Jensen (ed.). *Dansk Mediehistorie. Bd. (Vol.) 4, 1995-2001*. Copenhagen, Samfundslitteratur.
- Buonanno, Milly (Ed., 2000). *Continuity and Change. Television Fiction in Europe*. Luton, University of Luton Press.
- Danmarks kreative potentiale. Kultur- og erhvervspolitisk redegørelse* (2000). Danish Ministry for Business and Industry, and Ministry for Culture.
- Putnam, David (1997). *The Undeclared War*. London, Harper & Collins.



**Peter
Fisch**
European Commission
Belgium

The Humanities in the European Research Area

A challenge for the humanities, a challenge for Europe

By DR PETER FISCH

Dr Peter Fisch, PhD in Political Sciences, is Scientific Officer at the Research in Social Sciences and Humanities unit at the Directorate-General of the European Commission. His tasks include not only the monitoring of a number of research projects under the FP5 Key-Action "Improving the socio-economic knowledge base", but also the scientific secretariat for both the Management Committee and the External Advisory Group on this Key-Action. Most recently he was also in charge of coordinating analysis of the Expressions of Interest received for FP6 Priority 7 "Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society".

At the outset of this very important conference, I would like to briefly address three key issues, which will probably strongly influence our debate today and tomorrow.

1. The concept of the European Research Area (ERA)

When launching the initiative "Towards a European Research Area" in 2000, the European Commission, in general, and Commissioner Busquin, in particular, highlighted a number of objectives, of which I would like to recall just the most important ones in light of this meeting:

- There is a clear need to overcome fragmentation and inefficiencies in the way research in Europe is structured and organized

- Added value could be gained from improved cooperation by all actors involved
- Europe should (again?) become an attractive place for carrying out cutting-edge research and attracting the brightest brains from all over the world
- Joint European efforts would also send a strong signal to motivate young researchers to carry out research in Europe
- Overall, increased cooperation and, in a sense, constructive competition will lead to an enhancement of the scientific excellence across countries and disciplines.

In order to meet these ambitious objectives, major efforts are needed, not just by "Brussels", but by virtually all actors involved, at all levels and across all disciplines. As the ERA is conceived as an open initiative without any hierarchical structures, it will allow for a greater diversity of approaches, based on the specific requirements of regions or disciplines. It should be clear that such a far-reaching initiative not only has a direct impact on European research activities but is also intended to exert a powerful influence on the future formation of many research policies at national or regional level.

2. The particular role of the humanities in the ERA

Obviously, such a European Research Area would be incomplete without a strong role being assigned to the social sciences and the humanities. It must be stressed, however, that the humanities have a number of specific features that set them apart from other research fields. I will limit myself here to quoting just three of these important peculiarities.

1. Whereas the humanities are supposed to send a kind of "universal" message, focusing primarily on the advancement of knowledge for humankind rather than on competitive advantages to specific funders, they are at the same time much more dependent on national funding than any other discipline. The

lack of virtually any industrial multinational cooperation in this field and the scarce resources thus far devoted to international public funding schemes in the humanities make the national programmes the main focal point, not just for funding purposes, but in a broader sense also for agenda-setting.

2. Together with social sciences, humanities are organized in many different disciplines, without too strong a tie to link them together into a coherent package. At the same time, contrary to the so-called "hard sciences", humanities and social sciences in Europe are deeply embedded in a diversity of national research traditions (and research languages), which are part of the European wealth in this field, but which at the same time could hamper any cross-border exchange of ideas and results.
3. Finally, as a consequence, humanities are particularly sensitive to all sorts of European activities described by terms like "cooperation", "coordination", "integration", "harmonization" or "concentration". Although the need for further action in this direction now seems to be widely acknowledged, there is still widespread scepticism as to whether pursuing this avenue may compromise the quality of the research carried out.

In light of these persistent difficulties and obstacles, why should we nevertheless continue our efforts to create a European Research Area in the humanities? I think there are many good reasons for this, but I would like to highlight just a few:

- Comparative, transnational research is particularly relevant in the social sciences and humanities in order to gain additional insight into the specificities of each entity analysed.
- Humanities and social sciences have an important part to play in the future shaping of Europe, especially when it comes to our common history or core concepts like identity or governance.

- Contributions from the social sciences and humanities are urgently needed to improve our common understanding of an "enlarged" European Union and of Europe's role in a world context.

Any strategy to advance in this field should be built upon respect for diversity and upon a gradual approach to building up common initiatives. A possible starting point, in my view, could be the arrangement of regular dialogue between the various actors involved in order to create a steady flow of information. At a later stage, this could lead to the launch of initiatives for cooperation on programmes and to the development of a kind of common commitment.

Such initiatives should include as many of the relevant actors as possible, but obviously on a completely voluntary basis. Of these main schemes, I would like to mention the European Science Foundation, COST, regional cooperation schemes like the Nordic Council, national funding schemes like the research councils, private foundations like the Volkswagenstiftung and of course the EU Framework Programme.

3. The possible role of humanities in the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6)

With respect to the role of humanities in the EU Framework Programmes, it is fair to say that the story so far has been very short, since humanities "as such" have not yet been addressed. Previous Framework Programmes addressed the humanities within a specific context, defined specifically by information technologies or the preservation of cultural heritage.

At this stage, I would like to remind you that as the legal basis for European research activities the Amsterdam Treaty restricts these to activities promoting the competitiveness of European industries and improving the implementation of Community policies. While this is obviously not the appropriate basis for support-

ing all research activities in the humanities, it nevertheless allows some important fields to be made an integral part of our research portfolio.

In the forthcoming Sixth Framework Programme, humanities will be directly addressed, not just used as instruments in other contexts. At the current stage of preparation, under the so-called Priority 7 "Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society" we envisage addressing issues like cultural identity and identities, the role of languages in Europe or a European perspective on history. It should be clear that these activities can only be regarded as initial steps, but they are important steps in the right direction.

4. Conclusions

While the Sixth Framework Programme opens the door for the humanities, at least to some degree, the importance of the European Research Area initiative should not be neglected, as it will probably have greater repercussions in the research arena of the humanities.

Whether all these initiatives will finally lead to positive results will depend on a number of factors, but primarily on the enthusiasm and commitment of the scientific communities involved. I see this conference as a very promising attempt to get started and to build the basis of a hopefully promising future for the humanities within the European Research Area.



Forward Looks in European Research in the Humanities

By PROFESSOR GRETTY M. MIRDAL

Professor Gretty Mirdal, Dr Phil, research professor, works in two areas: the long-term impact of migration and transcultural integration on mental and physical health; and theory and practice in the psychological treatment of stress reactions and chronic disease. Gretty Mirdal is a member of the board of the Danish Research Foundation, a member of the Governing Council and of the Standing Committee for the Humanities at the European Science Foundation; a member of the European Research Advisory Board to the EU; a member of the Conseil Scientifique du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and a member of the Scientific Committee of the EFPPA, the European psychological association. She is a member of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters.

What is an ESF-Forward Look?

The Forward Look is a new instrument of the European Science Foundation (ESF) and the latest addition to existing instruments such as exploratory workshops, networks, programmes and Eurocores.

The aim of ESF's Forward Looks is to provide analyses of future research developments in old and new combinations of disciplines, in traditional as well as entirely new areas and problem fields. Forward Looks will be used to assess the direction research is likely to take in future and to guide funding agencies and member organisations in planning their resources to meet possible fu-

ture demand for e.g. new facilities and infrastructure. Forward Looks can be used to develop cooperation and coordination between national agencies and to inform the European Commission and the ESF itself.

The procedures and methods envisaged by the ESF constitute a preliminary, multi-stage process involving the creation of specialist preparatory workshops, study groups or the utilisation of existing expert groups and panels. The commissioning of high-level review papers can also be envisaged. The likely lead time will be 9-15 months.

The procedure is to be adapted to meet the needs of each particular topic and research community. In order to gain acceptance by scientific peers and impact on funding organisations, the recommendations must be made by researchers with high credibility: "the best ideas and capabilities...". A balance needs to be struck between soundness and expertise on the one hand, and adventurousness ("thinking the unthinkable") on the other; between the unpredictable nature of research and providing a useful guide for planning the next 5-10 years.

Why a new instrument ?

The ESF is in a period of transition as regards its position in European science. Mere funding and networking are no longer sufficient. The ESF has traditionally supported bottom-up, basic research.

"Bottom-up" and "top-down" are metaphors that have become clichés. Generally, researchers are interested in institutions that support bottom-up research, whereas policy-makers and politicians are interested in steering processes from the top down. I would like to comment on the research commissions, committees and boards. Strategies are generally planned by committees and commissions populated by individuals with very different backgrounds and interests. Most of the people active on these commissions, committees and boards are no longer engaged in

active research and, if they are, they are passionately—at times obsessively—concerned with their own topic and their own lines of enquiry, as well as very often being concerned about obtaining financial support for their own area of research.

Researchers, no matter how exceptional each may be in their own domain, will, when elected to a commission, pull in their own direction and work for the interests of their own field. The more different the interests, the less qualified a strategic report will be.

Commissions which prepare strategic plans and research policies often end up in a consensus based on a shared minimum standard, without much originality and inventiveness.

The ESF Forward Look can become a link between the researchers, the funding member organisations of the ESF and in the longer term the EU, by identifying topics of relevance to the advancement of research, the generation of new ways of thinking and new knowledge, by bridging the gap between research, technology, innovation, society and state (e.g. Edgar Morin).

The ESF Forward Look can give the policy-makers qualified input for their strategies by putting researchers at the centre of the decision processes and by bridging the gap between bottom-up and top-down through active interaction between researchers and policy-makers.

An example of ongoing Forward Look

Immigration and the construction of identities in a multicultural and multifaith Europe is an example of a Forward Look planned by the Standing Committee of the Humanities. The topics to be treated in this Forward Look are:

1. A historical perspective on transcultural/transnational identities in Europe:

This topic will be discussed under two headings:

A) The use of historical paradigms in constructing identities today. Tales, myths and images of earlier non-European identities,

and how they influence the perception and self-perception of immigrant populations in Europe today.

B) A historical perspective on the intergenerational aspects of collective identities: changes and transformations (e.g. upward mobility and identity assertion) in immigrant populations over generations.

2. Recognition and representation: National legislation, religious law and identity

The following topics will be addressed: Claims for legitimate recognition by non-European immigrants in Europe. Interactive relations between legal categories, religious discourse and the construction of identities. The effect of different forms of legislation on the practice of Islam. The acceptance or refusal of national legislation to follow Muslim rules.

3. The subjective experience of cultural belonging—Cultural and artistic expressions of identity:

How does the history and religion of the new countries, and how do their policies towards minorities influence the experience of cultural belonging and of the immigrants' own self-definition. Autobiographies, novels, poetry, films, immigrant literature and art will also be used as sources.

4. Language and identity:

What is a mother tongue? The appropriation of language. Changes in the language of origin. The production of "immigrant languages". The mechanisms of external borrowing (from a language source to a language contact) in linguistic change. The impact of immigrants' linguistic productions on the language of the host countries. Comparative studies across Europe on the emergence of new vernacular languages ("Languages of outcasts").

5. The development of psychosocial conflicts and their prevention:

The prevalence of aggressive behaviour and criminality in

marginalised second-generation immigrants, and the ensuing xenophobic reactions of the majority population are a cause of concern in many European societies. There is a need for anthropological, ethnographic and psychological studies into the way these phenomena (cultural beliefs, values and cognitive styles, e.g. causal attribution, risk perception and learned problem-solving behaviour) influence the development of inter-group conflicts.

6. Muslim-Christian interactions:

The relation between immigration studies and Islamic discourses. Changes in the perception of moral values, gender roles and the perception of shame and guilt among immigrants. The impact of a Muslim presence on the religious attitudes of the majority population.



The Contribution of the Humanities to the Objectives of the European Research Area

Declaration of the
Odense Conference, October 4 2002

Societal welfare is dependent on human resources, learning skills, the ability to communicate, cultural understanding and creative development, which are directly linked to basic research in the Arts and Humanities and to the universities' production of graduates. The Humanities are therefore part of the foundation of the knowledge economy.

For the future of Europe, politics and economics alike, socially sustainable solutions are the order of the day, i.e. solutions that are not merely tenable in technical and economic terms, but also ethically and socially, and that do justice to the dignity of individual human beings. Information technology, biotechnology and social development challenge our very concept of the human being and our standards of the good life and democratic principles on which European civilisation is built. Topics central to the Humanities, such as education, culture and gender, are being debated in society. This debate asks questions of research into the Humanities, in the hope of shedding light on identities, basic values, communications, society and history.

There is, however, a need to communicate the engagement and the potential of the Humanities, specifically to the research policies of Europe. There is a need both to safeguard basic research in

the Humanities and to develop the dialogue between researchers and society.

Research in the Humanities is instrumental in not only understanding but also transforming society. One of the ways in which this is achieved is in pioneering new forms of interdisciplinary cooperation that have evolved within recent years. Humanities researchers are collaborating with IT, medical, natural science and social science researchers in ways that were once inconceivable. In particular, collaboration has been developed in fields of research such as the environment, food, health and welfare. New scope has been generated for innovation through so-called art-science technology, including multimedia technology, the threshold of which we are still just teetering on, but which offers great potential for the industry of the future. New fields of research should be cultivated in order to supply a humanistic dimension to problem areas central to society.

Recommendations

1. There is a need to stimulate and focus basic research in the Humanities, e.g. by doing comparative research

The Humanities in Europe have been known for their extensive research on the language, culture and history of different European nation-states. Much of this research has had a strong national focus, and there has been relatively little collaboration across national boundaries. By applying a comparative approach to research in the Humanities, it will be possible to overcome these national barriers and develop new collaborative research agendas. The Humanities can both investigate issues deemed to be of wider significance to the European Union and raise questions that lead to entirely new scientific insights.

First and foremost, the aim of cooperation in the European Research Area is to achieve scientific excellence in our field. The following concerns are of central importance:

i. Critical investigation of established research frameworks

A key issue here will be examining the nature of established national traditions within the Humanities and the role of different nation-states in this. Of particular interest are comparative studies of the position of the Humanities as the inventors of national heritage and national identities, and the ways in which this has influenced research within the Humanities.

ii. New comparative frameworks of study

The Humanities have had two roles: 1) contributing to the construction of national identity and heritage, and 2) critical thinking with a view to the fundamental examination of existing frameworks of thought. When it comes to comparative research, we need to further develop the critical potential of the Humanities in a broader context.

In order to generate new frameworks of study, it will be necessary to look beyond the known map of separate European nation-states, with their formal cultural institutions and heritage organisations. In the course of the research process, new comparative research questions can be generated that will help us to develop new visions of economic, social cultural and political life in Europe.

iii. Tools and needs

It is necessary to make good research available in an internationally accessible language. For this purpose more use can be made of information technology, such as websites, electronic journals and electronic publications.

There is a need for more facilities (funding and cooperation between national research councils) for developing new research agendas.

The European network of Research Councils in the Humanities can be instrumental in developing these tools.

2. There is a need to develop a European research infrastructure for the Humanities

The Humanities need to develop advanced infrastructures across Europe by sharing, pooling or networking existing facilities and developing new ones. This need should be recognised when structuring the ERA, and also in the shape of FP6 and the ESF Plan 2006. Research infrastructures in the Humanities should include:

- large-scale research facilities,
- medium or small-scale research infrastructures with Europe-wide or regional impact, and
- scientific databases or collections of substantial value and European impact.

The workshop participants discussed concrete examples of pre-existing or planned research infrastructures, namely the building of a European Citation Index in the Humanities, undertaken by the Standing Committee for Humanities of the ESF, LIBER (Ligue des Bibliothèques Européennes de Recherches), which brings together about 300 libraries in Europe, and CENL (Conference of European National Librarians), networking 41 national libraries from 39 countries. Other research infrastructure projects were suggested by the workshop concerning libraries, archives, museums and existing databases in different fields.

It is recommended organising an ESF Exploratory Workshop to make a survey of all existing databases in the domain of the Humanities in all European countries, and to identify the need to coordinate existing organisational structures. This will undoubtedly lend decisive added value to our present knowledge. The exploratory workshop will certainly result in the emergence of a number of proposals for large-scale projects.

3. The role of the Humanities in future integrated projects of the European Framework Programme

We consider it important to initiate Humanities-driven integrated

projects that call for a variety of non-humanistic disciplines, for example an examination of society as an audio-visual culture, or an interdisciplinary critical examination of the "knowledge society".

As a prerequisite to this, the local and national academic cultures must reflect their research traditions and practice, and positively define their—potentially controversial and critical—contributions.

4. The Humanities need to identify their role in the European Research Area and in particular to identify and build structures to achieve this aim

The Humanities must be more clear about what they have to offer, and that offering should not just be formulated in vague and general terms.

The Humanities need to adopt a more proactive and assertive attitude, displaying it regularly in the appropriate circumstances.

The Humanities provide society with a general intellectual infrastructure, which may serve to provide an analysis of Europe's fundamental values and conditions. This is a fundamental prerequisite for economic growth and cohesion.

The Humanities should encourage dialogues across disciplinary boundaries, starting right at the Ph.D. training level.

The Humanities should aim at developing research programmes of relevance outside the Humanities as well, and include scientists from those other areas.

Cooperation within the ERA should partly build on existing research teams from bilateral to multilateral schemes, thus achieving efficiency without unnecessary bureaucracy, at the same time providing quality control of the integrated research.

These recommendations must inform ongoing discussions of the possible formation of a European Research Council, which must also include representatives of the Humanities.



List of Participants

Adão da Fonseca, Luis, Professor

Oporto University, Faculdade de Letras, Portugal

Agger, Gunhild, Associate professor

The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

Aalborg University, Department of Communication, Denmark

Alheit, Peter, Professor

Lehrstuhl fuer Allgemeine Paedagogik, Germany

Arciszewska, Barbara, Dr.

Uniwersytet Warszawski, Poland

Bache, Carl, Professor

The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

University of Southern Denmark

Institute of Language and Communication, Denmark

Berend, Nora, Dr.

St Catharine's College, United Kingdom

Berthoud, Gérald, Professor

University of Lausanne, Institut d'anthropologie et de sociologie

Switzerland

Bjerge, Mette, Head of section

The Danish Research Agency, Denmark

Bondebjerg, Ib, Professor

University of Copenhagen, Department of Film and Media Studies

Denmark

Booij, Geert, Professor

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Faculteit der Letteren, Netherlands

Bos, Annemarie, Director

Council for the Humanities, Netherlands

Bric, Maurice J., Academic Secretary

Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences

Ireland

Cancino, Rita, Associate professor

Aalborg University, Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies

Denmark

Chambelin, François, Financial manager
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, France

Comrie, Bernard, Professor
Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
Department of Linguistics, Germany

Coninck-Smith, Ning de, Dr.
The Danish University of Education
Department of Educational Sociology, Denmark

Duemose, Gitte, Head of section
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Denmark

Dürmeier, Silvia, Ms.
European Commission, Belgium

Ehrhardt, Birgitte, Public Relations Manager
The Danish Research Agency, Denmark

Fisch, Peter, Dr.
European Commission, Belgium

Friis-Jensen, Karsten, Associate professor
The Danish Research Council for the Humanities
University of Copenhagen, Department of Greek and Latin, Denmark

Haavardsholm, Torunn, Director
The Research Council of Norway, Norway

Haga, Anne Marie, Advisor
The Icelandic Research Council, Iceland

Hálfðánarson, Guðmundur, Professor
University of Iceland, Iceland

Hansen, Jens Morten, Director
The Danish Research Agency, Denmark

Hansson, Bengt, Professor
The Swedish Research Council, Sweden

Holm, Poul, Professor
The Danish Research Council for the Humanities
University of Southern Denmark, Institute of History and Civilization
Denmark

Hombert, Jean-Marie, Professor
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Département. des sciences de l'homme et de la société, France

Jubb, Michael, Dr.
The Arts and Humanities Research Board, United Kingdom

Just, Flemming, Professor
University of Southern Denmark, Institute of History and Civilization
Denmark

Jørgensen, Karin Dahl, Head of Division
The Danish Research Agency, Denmark

Kalsbeek, Vibeke, Head of section
The Danish Research Agency, Denmark

Kladakis, Grete, Head of secretariat
The Danish Research Agency, Denmark

Kranjc, Andrej, Dr.
Scientific Research Council of Humanities, Slovenia

Kratochvíl, Petr, Dr.
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Czech Republic

Kristiansen, Bente, Editor
The Danish Research Agency, Denmark

Lande, Trygve, Senior advisor
The Research Council of Norway, Norway

Lønstrup, Ansa, Associate professor
The Danish Research Council for the Humanities
University of Aarhus, The Centre for Interdisciplinary Aesthetic Studies
Denmark

Manikowski, Adam, Professor
Polish Academy of Sciences, Institute of History, Poland

Meier, Peter Uffe, Head of section
The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Denmark

Melby, Kari, Professor
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Dept. of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies, Norway

Mirdal, Gretty, Professor
University of Copenhagen, Department of Psychology, Denmark

Must, Ülle, Ms.

Estonian Science Foundation, Estonia

Mustajoki, Arto, Professor

Academy of Finland, Finland

Né Chad, Myriam

Attachée de coopération scientifique et universitaire

Ambassade de France à Copenhague, Denmark

Nielsen, Gunvor, Head of Section

The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Denmark

Nielsen, Erland Kolding, Director

The Royal Library, Denmark

Olwig, Karen Fog, Associate professor

University of Copenhagen, Institute of Anthropology, Denmark

Öhngren, Bo, Dr.

The Swedish Research Council, Sweden

Onega, Susana, Professor

Universidad de Zaragoza, Departamento de Filología Inglesa y Alemana

Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, España

Peyraube, Alain, Professor

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Département. des sciences de l'homme et de la société, France

Possing, Birgitte, Director, dr.phil.

Danish Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, Denmark

Prudky, Martin, ThDr., Doc.

Charles University, Protestant Theological Faculty, Czech Republic

Prætorius, Nini, Reader

The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

University of Copenhagen, Department of Psychology, Denmark

Ramat, Paolo, Professor

University of Pavia/CNR, Department of Linguistics, Italy

Savunen, Liisa, Director

Academy of Finland, Finland

Seim, Turid Karlsen, Professor

University of Oslo, Faculty of Theology, Norway

Severinsen, Hanne, Member of the Folketing
The Danish Parliament (the Folketing), Denmark

Steiner, Martin, Dr.
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Institute of Philosophy
Czech Republic

Stronkhorst, Henk, Dr.
European Science Foundation, France

Thijssen, Hans, Professor
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, Faculteit Filosofie, Netherlands

Vestergaard, Elisabeth, Dr.
European Science Foundation, Denmark

Weber, Kirsten, Professor
The Danish Research Council for the Humanities, Roskilde University
Department of Educational Research, Denmark

Ylander, Lars, Mr.
Europe of Cultures Forum, Brussels



At the beginning of the conference, the danish royal actress, Susse Wold recited "The Nightengale", a fairytale by Hans Christian Andersen.

Programme

Humanities—Essential research for Europe

The contribution of the Humanities
to the general objectives of the
European Union

University of Southern Denmark, October 3-4, 2002

The European Commission and the Council of Ministers have launched the concept of the European Research Area (ERA) as a powerful vision for European research in the 21st century. It calls for the overcoming of national boundaries and obstacles in order to facilitate coherence, mobility and joint efforts across Europe. Ultimately, it aims at strengthening the capacity of European researchers to contribute to economic competitiveness and quality of life. In this context, there is a need for the Humanities to identify its role in the European Research Area.

This conference will highlight the role of the Humanities in Europe. The conference will hear multidisciplinary approaches by the Humanities to important European social and cultural problems. The conference will demonstrate the added value of European collaboration to the research of the Humanities. The conference will also discuss how to strengthen the outreach role of the Humanities to European economic, social, cultural and political life.

Thursday, October 3 2002

11.00 Arrival and registration

12.00 Lunch

Chair: Professor *Carl Bache*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

13.00 The Danish actress *Susse Wold* recites "The Nightingale", a Hans Christian Andersen fairytale

13.30 Official opening

Member of the Danish Parliament (the Folketing),
Hanne Severinsen, President of the Research Committee of the Folketing

Humanities and social sciences, the European research area and the 6th framework programme

Dr. *Peter Fisch*, DG Research, European Commission

14.00 Introduction

Professor *Poul Holm*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

14.15 Language and prehistory

How linguistics can co-operate with other sciences in uncovering pre-historic human population movements

Keynote speaker: Professor *Bernard Comrie*, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig

15.00 Coffee break

15.30 History and identity.

Mediaeval frontiers and the formation of Europe

Keynote speaker:

Dr. *Nora Berend*, St Catharine's College, Cambridge

**16.15 Lifelong Learning as a Potential of European Development:
Two Analytical Perspectives on a 'Silent Revolution'**

Keynote speaker:

Professor *Peter Alheit*, Department of Education, Georg-August-University, Gottingen

17.00 Panel debate

17.45 Return to the hotel by bus

18.45 Excursion to The Hans Christian Andersen Childhood Home

20.00 Dinner at the restaurant Sortebro Kro in The Funen Village

Friday, October 4, 2002

Chair: Associate professor *Gunhild Agger*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

9.00 Briefing session

**Humanities and social sciences in framework programme 6
– New topics, new instruments, new challenges**

Dr. *Peter Fisch*, DG Research, European Commission

Forward looks in European research in the humanities

Professor *Gretty M. Mirdal*, member of EURAB, Department of Psychology, Copenhagen University

10.00 Workshops

12.00 Lunch

**13.00 Culture, Media and Globalization.
Humanities and the European Project.**

Keynote speaker:

Professor *Ib Bondebjerg*, Department of Film and Media Studies,
University of Copenhagen

Debate

14.00 Coffee break

14.30 Reports from the workshops

15.30 Debate

15.45 Conclusion

Professor *Poul Holm*, The Danish Research Council for the Hu-
manities

Workshop themes

**1. How to stimulate and focus more fundamental
research in the humanities e.g. by doing comparative
research**

Chairs: Professor *Geert Booij*, Netherlands Organization for Sci-
entific Research (NWO) and

Associate professor *Karen Fog Olwig*, The Danish Research
Council for the Humanities

**2. European infrastructure (e.g. citation index and
databases)**

Chairs: Professor *Alain Peyraube*, The French Ministry of Re-

search and Associate professor *Karsten Friis-Jensen*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

3. How to structure European research area (ERA) for the humanities

Chairs: Professor *Bengt Hansson*, The Swedish Research Council and Reader *Nini Prætorius*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

4. The role of the humanities in future integrated projects of the European framework programme

Chairs: Professor *Kirsten Weber*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities and Associate professor *Ansa Lønstrup*, The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

The European Network of Research Councils for the Humanities, ERCH, was established in connection with the conference. Chairman of the Danish Research Council, Professor Poul Holm, is chairman of the board of the ERCH. The other members of the board are: chairman of the Dutch Council for the Humanities, Professor Geert Booij and dr. Maurice Bric from the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences.

Mandate for European Network of Research Councils for the Humanities

Name

European Network of Research Councils for the Humanities (ERCH)

Membership

Members of the Network are the national humanities research councils, members of the European Science Foundation, or the national academy for the humanities if a research council is not in existence.

Objective

The ERCH will work to strengthen the Humanities in Europe at the political and organisational level.

Tools

- to exchange information of good practices, resources and quality control
- to influence the funding bodies for research at the European level

- to further collaboration with respect to national programmes sharing common themes
- to cooperate concerning international peer reviews for evaluation of research proposals

Secretariat

The ERCH will use the ESF as a clearing house for relevant information between member organisations. The ESF will provide a homepage for the ERCH, including ERCH documents, links to member organisations and links to national policy documents (preferably to English-language documents or summaries).

Additional administrative services should be provided the chairperson's national research council secretariat.

Board

The Board of the ERCH will consist of a chairperson and two members-at-large elected at the annual spring meeting of the ERCH. Elections will be for one year, renewable once for the same position.

The Board can initiate actions to further the goals of the Network after consultation with members.

Annual General Meeting

The ERCH will hold one Annual General Meeting in spring, preferably in connection with the meeting of the Core group members of ESF Standing Committee for The Humanities and the Member Organisations' Senior Administrators. The Board will compile the agenda after consultation with ERCH members. Decisions are reached by simple majority of members present.

This document was agreed to at the inaugural meeting of the ERCH in Odense October 2002.



Head of secretariat, senior advisor,
Grete M. Kladakis, gk@forsk.dk



Head of section
Vibeke Kalsbeek, vka@forsk.dk



Editor
Bente Kristiansen, bkr@forsk.dk

The Danish Research Council for the Humanities

Randersgade 60
2100 Copenhagen Ø
Telph. +45 3544 6200

This book presents the contributions to the conference *Humanities—Essential Research for Europe*, held in Odense in October 2002, during the Danish Presidency of the European Union.

Besides the contributions of the keynote speakers and the speakers in the briefing sessions, you will find a declaration entitled *The Contribution of the Humanities to the European Research Area*, on which conference attendees reached consensus.

Finally, the book includes the mandate for a new network, *The European Network of Research Councils for the Humanities*, which was established during the conference.



The Danish Research Agency

Ministry of Science
Technology and Innovation

Randersgade 60
DK-2100 Copenhagen Ø
Tlf. (+45) 3544 6200
Fax (+45) 3544 6201
www.forsk.dk
forsk@forsk.dk